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ENFORCING A CRITICAL ENTITLEMENT: 
PREEMPTION CLAIMS AS AN ALTERNATIVE 
WAY TO PROTECT MEDICAID RECIPIENTS’ 
ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE 
Abstract: When faced with shrinking budgets and swelling Medicaid rolls, 
states frequently try to reduce Medicaid spending by slashing provider re-
imbursement rates. Reimbursement rates, however, significantly impact 
provider participation and consumer access to healthcare services. There-
fore, such cutbacks to Medicaid’s already low rates often undermine the 
program’s promise of “mainstream” medical access for the poor and dis-
abled. Medicaid beneficiaries and providers long used the court system to 
combat these rate cuts by suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and arguing that 
inadequate reimbursement rates violate the “equal access provision” of 
the federal Medicaid Act. But in 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court foreclosed 
this avenue of relief and seemed to leave doctors and patients without 
standing to challenge even the most draconian rate cuts. A recent series 
of decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, 
suggests that the Supremacy Clause presents an alternative means of en-
forcing the equal access provision. This Note explores both the promise 
and pitfalls of an equal access preemption claim and argues that Medi-
caid providers and beneficiaries should be able to enjoin significant rate 
cutbacks and protect healthcare access by challenging state changes to re-
imbursement rates as preempted by the Medicaid Act. 
Introduction 
 In 2007, in suburban Maryland, twelve-year-old Deamonte Driver 
died of complications arising from a tooth abscess.1 He died, in part be-
cause his mother, Alyce, could not find a dentist who accepted Medicaid 
patients and was willing to treat him.2 Alyce had been struggling for 
months to find a dentist to treat Deamonte and his younger brother, 
DaShawn, who constantly complained of toothaches.3 Even with the 
help of an attorney, however, it took many weeks and more than two 
dozen phone calls to the Drivers’ Medicaid provider for the family to 
                                                                                                                      
1 Mary Otto, For Want of a Dentist, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2007, at B01. 
2 Id. In 2007, less than one-fifth of Maryland’s dentists accepted Medicaid patients. Id. 
3 Id. 
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locate a willing dentist.4 During this time, Deamonte’s abscess went un-
treated and bacteria spread from his mouth to his brain, causing the 
brain infection that ultimately killed him.5 
 States have long regarded spending on Medicaid—the joint fed-
eral-state health insurance program for the “deserving poor”6—as a 
major financial pressure and, therefore, frequently target it for budget 
cuts.7 Common cost-control strategies include restricting eligibility, 
trimming benefits, raising copayments, and reducing provider reim-
bursement rates.8 Lowering reimbursement rates is often the preferred 
strategy because the political and financial ramifications are often less 
immediately apparent than those provoked by direct cuts in eligibility 
or benefits for the needy people who depend on Medicaid for health 
insurance.9 When the needy are ineligible for Medicaid, or their 
healthcare benefits are reduced, their health needs immediately either 
go unmet or are shifted onto local hospitals, clinics, and other state-
financed programs.10 When providers’ rates are reduced, however, al-
though physicians and hospitals are unhappy, the immediate conse-
quences for Medicaid recipients do not appear to be as grave.11 Thus, 
in many states Medicaid reimbursement rates have traditionally been 
far lower than those of Medicare12 or private insurers—so low, in fact, 
                                                                                                                      
4 Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid 
Entitlements, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 413, 419 (2008) (explaining that only certain categories 
of the poor, such as children, pregnant women, and the aged, blind, or permanently dis-
abled, must be eligible for Medicaid); see 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006) (listing the 
groups for which a state must provide Medicaid in order to receive federal funding). 
7 Vernon Smith et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. 
Kaiser Family Found., Report No. 7815, Headed for a Crunch: An Update on Medicaid 
Spending, Coverage and Policy Heading into an Economic Downturn; Results from 
a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, at 8, 14 
(2008), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7815.pdf (noting that, on average, 
Medicaid spending accounts for an impressive seventeen percent of state spending). 
8 See The Medicaid Dilemma: Shrinking Budgets, Difficult Choices, TrendWatch (Am. Hosp. 
Ass’n, Washington, D.C.), June 2003, at 4, available at http://www.aha.org/aha/trendwatch/ 
2003/tw2003vol5no2pt1.pdf; see also Abigail R. Moncrieff, Comment, Payments to Medicaid 
Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal Access” Provision, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 673, 673 (2006). 
9 See Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 673–74; The Medicaid Dilemma, supra note 8, at 5–6. 
10 See The Medicaid Dilemma, supra note 8, at 6. See generally Anna Tavis, Note, Healthcare 
for All: Ensuring States Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1627 (2010) (exploring the consequences of Massachusetts and New Jersey making 
legal immigrants ineligible for Commonwealth Care and FamilyCare, respectively). 
11 See Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 673–74. 
12 Medicare is a federal health insurance program that offers coverage to people aged 
sixty-five and over, and people with permanent disabilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006); 
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that many healthcare providers lose money when they treat Medicaid 
patients.13 Because of these paltry reimbursement rates, healthcare 
providers commonly refuse to treat Medicaid patients.14 
 As the Driver family’s tragedy illustrates, low provider reimburse-
ment rates can ultimately mean that Medicaid recipients encounter 
significant delays in accessing non-emergency treatment15 and are lim-
ited in their choice of qualified providers.16 This fundamentally un-
dermines Medicaid’s core goal of providing “mainstream” medical ac-
cess to the poor and disabled.17 
 Due to the current recession, the financial outlook for Medicaid is 
especially grim.18 Thousands more people than expected have been 
added to states’ Medicaid rolls since the economic downturn began in 
2007.19 At the same time, enormous budget shortfalls have led many 
                                                                                                                      
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Report No. 1066-12, Medicare Fact Sheet: Medi-
care at a Glance (2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-12.pdf. 
13 See Robert Lowes, Will Healthcare Reform Increase Medicaid Pay as Well as Enrollment?, 
Medscape Med. News, Mar. 23, 2010, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/718673. In 
2008, Medicaid reimbursement rates, on average, were only 72% of Medicare rates; reim-
bursement rates for primary care services were even lower, at around 66% of Medicare 
rates. Id. During the same period, Medicare itself paid 12% less than private insurers. Id. In 
March 2010, however, as part of national healthcare reform, Congress mandated that in 
2013–2014 federal funding will be used to raise Medicaid reimbursement rates to 100% of 
Medicare rates for primary care services provided by pediatricians, family physicians, and 
general internists. Heath Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
152, § 1202, 124 Stat. 1029, 1052–53; see The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Report No. 
8023-R, Summary of Coverage Provisions in the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 
(2010), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/8023-R.pdf. Although this is 
a positive step, Medicare rates themselves are often inadequate, and this reform applies 
only to primary care providers. See Lowes, supra. 
14 Sean Jessee, Comment, Fulfilling the Promise of the Medicaid Act: Why the Equal Access 
Clause Creates Privately Enforceable Rights, 58 Emory L.J. 791, 797 (2009). 
15 Id. at 798. 
16 See Barry Furrow et al., Health Law 23 (2d ed. 2000). 
17 See Medicare and Medicaid, Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 91st Cong. 57 (1970) 
(statement of Hon. John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare) (testifying that “[t]he whole purpose of the 1965 act” was to provide “‘main-
stream medical care’ for all the people of this country”); see also Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 
675. 
18 Vernon Smith et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Report No. 7985, The Crunch Continues: Medicaid 
Spending, Coverage and Policy in the Midst of a Recession; Results from a 50-
State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2009 and 2010, at 7 (2009), 
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7985.pdf. 
19 Pauline Vu, Medicaid Programs Feel Weight of Recession, Stateline, Feb. 6, 2009, http:// 
www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=374699. For example, in 2009, Kentucky 
added three thousand people per month to its Medicaid rolls, three times as many as antici-
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states to cut Medicaid spending—often by reducing provider reim-
bursement rates.20 These pressures will eventually be compounded by 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (PPACA) expansion 
of Medicaid to millions of poor Americans who were not previously eli-
gible.21 Although the federal government will initially finance this ex-
pansion, states will have to shoulder some of the costs after 2016.22 In 
light of the ongoing recession and the swelling of Medicaid rolls, it is 
critical for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers to be able to demand 
powerfully that states stop targeting reimbursement rates as a way to 
balance budgets.23 This Note contends that bringing suit under the 
federal Supremacy Clause is a viable way for these groups to protect 
reimbursement rates and, thereby, protect healthcare access for Medi-
caid beneficiaries.24 
 Throughout the 1990s, Medicaid beneficiaries and providers 
sought to ensure adequate reimbursement rates by bringing civil suits 
against state Medicaid officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.25 Courts were 
                                                                                                                      
pated; Florida added two hundred thousand to its Medicaid rolls in 2008, twelve percent 
more than in 2007. Id. 
20 See Smith et al., supra note 18, at 30. The American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (ARRA) helped to offset the current economic strain on state Medicaid pro-
grams by temporarily increasing the share of Medicaid costs paid by the federal govern-
ment (known as “FMAP”). American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-5, § 5001, 123 Stat 115, 496–502; see Vernon Smith et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medi-
caid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Report No. 8105, Hoping 
for Economic Recovery, Preparing for Health Reform: results from a 50-State 
Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011, at 5 (2010), http:// 
www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8105.pdf. This enhanced funding, however, is due to ex-
pire in June 2011; the ensuing drop in federal funding will likely force states to make addi-
tional cutbacks in Medicaid spending in order to keep their budgets balanced. See Smith 
et al., supra, at 5. 
21 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 
124 Stat. 119, 271–79; The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 13. All individuals 
under the age of sixty-five with incomes at or below 133% of the federal poverty level will 
be eligible for Medicaid. § 2001, 124 Stat. at 271. 
22 See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 13. The federal government will 
pay all the costs of covering those who are “newly eligible” for Medicaid in 2014–2016. Id. 
From 2017 onwards, however, it will provide slightly less federal funding each year. Id. 
23 See Smith et al., supra note 18, at 30; Vu, supra note 19. 
24 See U.S. Const. art. VI; infra notes 231–303 and accompanying text. 
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 
F.3d 997, 999 (1st Cir. 1996); Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 
1996); Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993). Although outside the 
scope of this Note, it should be noted that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers also tried, 
with some success, to combat low reimbursement rates by using § 1983 to bring suits under 
some other provisions of the Medicaid Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2006), the 
“reasonable promptness” clause. See Okla. Chapter of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 
336 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1109 (N.D. Okla. 2005) (concluding that “reasonably prompt assis-
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generally receptive to claims brought under § 1983 to enforce various 
provisions of the Medicaid Act, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A)26 
(the “equal access provision”).27 This provision requires state Medicaid 
programs to provide “methods and procedures” for payment rates that 
are consistent with quality care and adequate to enlist enough providers 
so that healthcare services are available to Medicaid beneficiaries “at 
least to the extent” they are available to the “general population” in the 
same area.28 Some plaintiffs prevailed in arguing that state Medicaid 
officials violated § 30(A) by inadequately providing for the reimburse-
ment of Medicaid providers.29 In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent clarification of the requirements for stating a cause of action in a 
§ 1983 suit,30 however, there is a clear trend in the U.S. courts of appeals 
away from allowing private individuals to challenge Medicaid reim-
bursement rates under § 1983.31 
 Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suggested 
that an alternative way of enforcing the equal access provision is possi-
                                                                                                                      
tance” is denied where Medicaid’s reimbursement rates are insufficient to attract an ade-
quate number of healthcare providers), rev’d 472 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007); see also Jessee, 
supra note 14, at 815. 
26 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006). The provision requires a state plan for medical 
assistance to 
provide such methods and procedures relating to the utilization of, and the 
payment for, care and services available under the plan . . . as may be neces-
sary to safeguard against unnecessary utilization of such care and services and 
to assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of 
care and are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are 
available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are 
available to the general population in the geographic area . . . . 
Id. 
27 See, e.g., Bullen, 93 F.3d at 1005; Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1028–29; Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 522 
(holding that the equal access provision “require[s] states to ensure that Medicaid recipi-
ents have access to medical care that is at least equal to that of the general population”). 
28 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A); see Bullen, 93 F.3d at 999; Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1028–29; 
Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 522. 
29 See Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 531 (concluding that a reimbursement rate reduction by Ar-
kansas’s Medicaid program violated § 30(A)). But see Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1029–30 (deciding 
that plaintiffs failed to show reimbursement rates set by Indiana’s Medicaid program vio-
lated the equal access provision); cf. Bullen, 93 F.3d at 999, 1011 (remanding for further 
proceedings on plaintiff’s substantive claims). 
30 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280 (2002); infra notes 113–117 and accom-
panying text (discussing new standard announced by Gonzaga). 
31 See, e.g., Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 2007); 
Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside 
Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542 (6th Cir. 2006); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 
1060 (9th Cir. 2005); Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 57 (1st 
Cir. 2004). 
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ble.32 In 2008, in Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. 
Shewry, the Ninth Circuit upheld a preliminary injunction enjoining 
the enforcement of a California law that cut reimbursements for Medi-
caid providers by ten percent.33 The court concluded that Medicaid 
recipients and providers, who brought the suit on the theory that the 
state’s rate cut was preempted by the federal Medicaid Act’s equal ac-
cess provision, had a proper cause of action under the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Supremacy Clause.34 This holding and subsequent opinions is-
sued by the court reveal that the Ninth Circuit—although it has held 
that the equal access provision is not enforceable via § 198335—will al-
low the enforcement of the equal access provision via the Supremacy 
Clause.36 Thus, preemption seems to present a promising (and, as yet, 
relatively unexplored) method of enforcing the equal access provision 
in order to protect provider reimbursement rates and thereby protect 
access to healthcare for Medicaid recipients.37 
 This Note argues that Medicaid recipients and providers should be 
able to enforce the equal access provision by challenging state changes 
to reimbursement rates as preempted by the Medicaid Act.38 If they 
cannot, Medicaid risks becoming a worthless safety net because provider 
shortages will leave many recipients unable to access even basic health-
care.39 Although litigation in Independent Living Center is ongoing, this 
Note suggests that preemption is a viable way to meaningfully enforce 
the equal access provision.40 Therefore, preemption should no longer 
                                                                                                                      
32 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry (Independent Living I ), 543 F.3d 1047, 
1048–49 (9th Cir.), opinion issued by (Independent Living II ), 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly 
(Independent Living III ), 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d 725 
(9th Cir. 2009), and petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-
958). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 See Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1060, 1062 (holding that neither Medicaid recipients nor 
providers can enforce the equal access provision under § 1983 because the provision does 
not create the sort of individual right Gonzaga requires for § 1983 suits). 
36 See Independent Living I, 543 F.3d at 1048–49; infra notes 211–215, 222 and accompa-
nying text (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s related rulings). 
37 See Rochelle Bobroff, Section 1983 and Preemption: Alternative Means of Court Access for 
Safety Net Statutes, 10 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 27, 73–74 (2008). 
38 See infra notes 46–79, 231–303 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 46–79, 231–303 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 231–303 and accompanying text. A prototypical § 30(A) preemption 
claim, aimed at enjoining Medicaid cutbacks, would allege that a state law regulating 
Medicaid reimbursement rates conflicts with the federal Medicaid Act’s equal access provi-
sion. See infra notes 137–158, 258–270 and accompanying text (explaining that the Su-
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be overlooked or dismissed—as it generally was prior to Independent Liv-
ing Center—as an alternative to § 1983 enforcement of the equal access 
provision.41 In Parts I and II, this Note provides a brief history of Medi-
caid and the equal access provision.42 Part III explains the rise and fall of 
enforcement of the equal access provision under § 1983.43 Part IV dis-
sects Independent Living Center in terms of its presentation of a federal 
preemption claim as a viable way for Medicaid providers and beneficiar-
ies to enjoin the implementation of significant cutbacks to reimburse-
ment rates by state Medicaid programs.44 Finally, Part V explores both 
the promise and the pitfalls of preemption and the equal access provi-
sion as a means to achieve and protect adequate access to healthcare for 
Medicaid beneficiaries—and thus as a means to prevent other families 
from suffering a tragedy like that of the Drivers.45 
                                                                                                                      
premacy Clause allows such suits). The plaintiff would be careful to name as defendants 
only state officers who “have some connection with the enforcement of the act” so as to fall 
within the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity recognized by Ex parte Young. See 
209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908). The plaintiff would request, as a remedy, prospective injunctive 
relief. See infra notes 271–279 and accompanying text (outlining available remedies). If the 
court finds that the plaintiff has standing to proceed, the plaintiff would seek a prelimi-
nary injunction so as to enjoin the state’s rate-reducing legislation during the litigation. See 
infra notes 165–221 and accompanying text (tracing Independent Living Center’s slow jour-
ney through the court system). At all stages of the suit, the plaintiff would be careful to 
argue under the controlling interpretation of the equal access clause in the particular 
jurisdiction. See infra notes 239–251 and accompanying text (comparing competing inter-
pretations of § 30(A)). 
41 See Bobroff, supra note 37, at 72–73; Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 437–38 n.126; 
Jessee, supra note 14, at 821–23. 
In a 2008 article, Rochelle Bobroff (who later represented the Independent Living Center 
plaintiffs) analyzed the application of preemption and § 1983 to the enforcement of fed-
eral safety net statutes. See Bobroff, supra note 37, at 30. But Bobroff only briefly touched 
on what this means for the equal access provision. See id. at 72–73. 
In a 2008 article, Nicole Huberfeld addressed the narrowed ability of those trying to 
enforce Medicaid entitlements via § 1983 and suggested legislative responses; but preemp-
tion is relegated to a footnote. See Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 413–14, 437–38 n.126. 
In a 2009 comment, Sean Jessee briefly acknowledged that preemption may be an alter-
native way to challenge low reimbursement rates. See Jessee, supra note 14, at 821–23, 826. But 
Jessee argued that because (1) the 2008 decision did not touch on the merits of the preemp-
tion claim and (2) the Supreme Court has suggested that without a “persuasive” reason, pre-
emption is not favored, preemption is not yet a viable alternative to § 1983 in the Medicaid 
rate context. See id. Since Jessee’s comment was published, however, the Ninth Circuit has 
issued additional opinions in Independent Living Center and lower courts have analyzed and 
applied the case’s reasoning. See infra notes 211–230 and accompanying text. 
42 See infra notes 46–88 and accompanying text. 
43 See infra notes 89–128 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 129–230 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 231–303 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Medicaid Program 
A. Origins, Purpose, and Scope of the Program 
 Until the Medicaid Act was enacted in 1965,46 healthcare in Amer-
ica was a two-tiered system: wealthy Americans were cared for by private 
providers, but poor Americans generally were cared for—if at all—in 
emergency rooms and charitable clinics.47 Medicaid was intended to 
eliminate the lower tier by providing at least some of the nation’s poor 
with “mainstream” healthcare: access to good hospitals and private phy-
sicians.48 The program has four general categories of eligibility: chil-
dren and their caretakers, pregnant women, people with disabilities, 
and the elderly.49 
 Medicaid is a joint federal-state welfare program, in which the fed-
eral government shares costs with states that choose to participate in the 
program.50 It is structured as one of the federal grant-in-aid programs, 
which are enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause powers, and 
which condition states’ receipt of federal funds on compliance with spe-
cific requirements—in this case, those laid out in the Medicaid Act.51 To 
participate, a state must submit to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services a “plan for medical assistance”52 that describes the scope and 
nature of the state’s Medicaid program and complies with the require-
ments of the Medicaid Act.53 If the Secretary approves the plan, the state 
                                                                                                                      
46 Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
(2006)). 
47 See Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 675. 
48 See Jessee, supra note 14, at 794; Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 675. 
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (describing the groups of individuals for whom a 
state must provide Medicaid in order to receive federal funding). Income, immigration, 
and residency restrictions must also be met. See id. 
50 See Jessee, supra note 14, at 794. 
51 See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit 
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 5, 10 (2006). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a). The Act defines “medical assistance” as “payment” for the cost 
of certain medical services, rather than the actual provision of medical services. See id. 
§ 1396d(a) (2006); Julia Gilmore Gaughan, Comment, Institutionalization as Discrimination: 
How Medicaid Waivers, the ADA, and § 1983 Fail, 56 U. Kan. L. Rev. 405, 409 (2008). 
Because every state creates and maintains its own Medicaid program and because the 
Medicaid Act is so broadly worded and flexible, variation among the states in terms of 
eligibility, coverage, delivery, and reimbursement “is the rule rather than the exception.” 
Elicia J. Herz, Cong. Research Serv., RL33202, Medicaid: A Primer, summary (2008). 
The Medicaid Act even allows states to experiment beyond the parameters of its broad 
regulations via a waiver program. See Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 676 . 
53 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (listing the requirements for state Medicaid plans to receive federal 
funding). Historically, the Medicaid Act required states to provide seven services. See 42 
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can submit quarterly expense reports and will be reimbursed for a por-
tion of the costs it incurs by administering the program and paying 
healthcare providers for their services.54 If a state fails to comply with 
the Act’s requirements, including those related to provider reimburse-
ment rates, the Secretary is authorized to revoke federal funding.55 
 Today, Medicaid is a major player in the country’s healthcare sys-
tem.56 Within state budgets, spending on Medicaid programs is second 
only to spending on education.57 Nationally, Medicaid provides health 
insurance coverage to sixty million people and accounts for roughly 
17% of all healthcare spending and 7% of the total federal budget.58 
B. An Ever-Growing Reimbursement Crisis 
 State Medicaid programs have a great deal of freedom, even within 
the bounds of the equal access provision, to establish their own reim-
bursement rates for providers and their own system of setting and pay-
ing those rates.59 As a result, the process of setting Medicaid reim-
                                                                                                                      
U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(1)–(5), (17), (21) (listing services including inpatient 
hospital; outpatient hospital; other laboratory and x-ray; nursing facility; early and periodic 
screening, diagnostic, and treatment; physician; nurse-midwife; and nurse-practitioner). Each 
state, however, could choose to provide additional services as part of its Medicaid program, 
such as dental services or prescription drug coverage. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 
1396d(a)(10), (12). In 2005, however, Congress passed the Deficit Reduction Act (the 
“DRA”), which allows states to provide only “benchmark” coverage for certain groups instead 
of the traditional Medicaid benefits package. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
171, 120 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 and 42 U.S.C.); see Kaiser 
Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Report 
No. 7465, Deficit Reduction Act of 2005: Implications for Medicaid 2–3 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7465.pdf. Under the DRA, states can choose to 
model Medicaid benefits on certain “benchmarks,” such as the biggest commercial HMO in 
the state, a plan offered to state or federal employees, and any proposal approved by the 
Secretary. Id. at 3. 
54 April Grady, Cong. Research Serv., RS22849, Medicaid Financing 1 (2008). 
The federal share for administrative costs does not vary by state (states are generally reim-
bursed for 50% of the cost of administering their Medicaid program). Id. at 1–2. The fed-
eral share for provider reimbursement, however, varies according to a state’s federal medi-
cal assistance percentage (“FMAP”) and can range from 50% to 83%, depending in part 
on states’ per capita income. Id. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (2006) (describing when the Secretary may refuse to make pay-
ments to a state’s Medicaid program). 
56 See Smith et al., supra note 18, at 9. 
57 Id. at 14. 
58 Grady, supra note 54, at 3; Smith et al., supra note 18, at 9. 
59 See Herz, supra note 52, at 10; Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 676 (noting that state 
Medicaid programs can either reimburse providers via private managed care organizations 
or by acting as a third-party payer on behalf of Medicaid beneficiaries). 
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bursement rates varies from state to state.60 Frequently, the state agency 
that administers Medicaid prescribes reimbursement rates as part of its 
budget proposal to the state legislature and submits its reimbursement 
methodology to the Secretary (who reviews it for consistency with 
§ 30(A)) for approval as part of the state plan.61 Sometimes, however, a 
state statute dictates a particular methodology for rate setting or a spe-
cific rate for a certain medical service.62 
 Despite this variation in procedure, Medicaid reimbursement rates 
have traditionally63 been significantly lower than those of both Medicare 
and private insurers.64 This is problematic primarily because reim-
bursement rates are “an important determinant of provider participa-
tion and access to services for Medicaid beneficiaries.”65 Not surpris-
ingly, nationwide physician surveys show that although most physicians 
accept Medicaid patients, fewer accept new Medicaid patients than new 
patients with other types of insurance.66 Furthermore, more physicians 
accept new Medicaid patients in states that have higher Medicaid reim-
bursement rates than in states with lower rates.67 Physicians frequently 
cite low Medicaid reimbursement rates as their principal reason for re-
                                                                                                                      
60 See Mark Merlis, Cong. Research Serv., RL32644, Medicaid Reimbursement 
Policy 1 (2004). 
61 See, e.g., Anne Dunkelberg, Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid and State Budgets: A Case Study of Texas 2–
4, 18 (2002) (describing how Texas sets its Medicaid budget); Eleanor Kinney, Kaiser 
Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid 
and State Budgets: A Case Study of Indiana 1–6, 10 (2002) (describing how Indiana sets 
its Medicaid budget); Carson Strege-Flore & Allyson Hauck, Kaiser Comm’n on Medi-
caid & the Uninsured, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Medicaid and State Budg-
ets: A Case Study of Idaho 2–3 (2002) (describing how Idaho sets its Medicaid budget). 
62 See, e.g., Minn. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 812 (D. Minn. 
2010) (describing how a Minnesota statute limits the maximum reimbursement rate for 
prescription drugs); Dunkelberg, supra note 61, at 18 (noting that although generally 
HMOs participating in Texas’s Medicaid program negotiate their own reimbursement 
rates, a Texas statute requires fee increases for some services be passed on to providers). 
63 In March 2010, Congress eliminated the historical disparity between Medicaid and 
Medicare rates for a few types of healthcare providers. See Heath Care and Education Rec-
onciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1202, 124 Stat. 1029, 1052–53 (to be codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396u-2, 1396d); see also supra note 13. 
64 See Smith et al., supra note 7, at 30; supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
65 Smith et al., supra note 7, at 30. Some researchers, however, have disputed the link 
between higher fees and higher physician participation in Medicaid. Stephen Zuckerman 
et al., Trends in Medicaid Physician Fees, 2003–2008, Health Aff., w517 (Apr. 28, 2009), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/28/3/w510. 
66 Stephen Zuckerman et al., Changes in Medicaid Physician Fees, 1998–2003: Implications 
for Physician Participation, Health Aff., W4-381 ( June 23, 2004), http://content.health 
affairs.org/cgi/reprint/hlthaff.w4.374v1; see also Smith et al., supra note 7, at 30. 
67 See Zuckerman et al., supra note 66, at W4–381. 
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fusing to accept Medicaid patients.68 Thus, low reimbursement rates can 
negatively impact the ability of Medicaid beneficiaries to access health-
care—particularly primary, specialty, and dental care—outside of an 
emergency room.69 
 During the last economic downturn, from 2001 to 2004, every state 
froze or reduced physician reimbursement rates in order to contain 
Medicaid spending.70 The cutbacks exposed the vulnerabilities of 
Medicaid reimbursement, and Deamonte Driver’s death in 2007 
brought the issue into the national spotlight.71 As the economy im-
proved, many states began to focus on increasing reimbursement rates 
in an effort to make up for the years of reduced or frozen rates.72 
 A 2008 survey of Medicaid program directors by the Kaiser Com-
mission on Medicaid and the Uninsured found that, specifically be-
cause of such increases, patient access had improved in some states 
from 2007.73 The survey reported that, although access to primary care 
physicians was “generally regarded as favorable,” most states still “re-
ported some or significant problems accessing” specialized care and 
dental care.74 
 Due to the current economic recession, states are once again slash-
ing reimbursement rates as a way to balance their budgets.75 At the start 
of fiscal year 2010, three out of every four states expected budget short-
                                                                                                                      
68 Smith et al., supra note 7, at 30. 
69 See id. at 54. 
70 See Smith et al., supra note 18, at 6. Medicaid is always strained during economic 
downturns because increases in unemployment cause Medicaid enrollment (and therefore 
state spending on Medicaid) to soar while also causing tax revenues (used by states to pay 
for Medicaid) to decline. See Smith et al., supra note 7, at 7; see also Smith et al., supra 
note 20, at 6 (“More than any other area, provider rates are linked to economic condi-
tions. Under budget pressure, states turn to rate cuts to have an immediate budget impact 
. . . .”). 
71 See Smith et al., supra note 7, at 54. 
72 Id. at 25, 30. 
73 Id. at 10. 
74 Id. Roughly 17% of states reported problems with access to primary care for Medi-
caid beneficiaries; 36% reported problems with access to specialty care; and 39% percent 
reported problems with access to dental care. Id. at 55 fig.29. 
75 See Vernon Smith et al., Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Report No. 8049, Medicaid’s Continuing Crunch In 
a Recession: A Mid-Year Update for State FY 2010 and Preview for FY 2011, at 5 
(2010), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8049.pdf. For example, on Janu-
ary 1, 2010, Kansas’s Medicaid program cut provider reimbursement rates by ten percent. 
Kevin Sack & Robert Pear, States Consider Medicaid Cuts as Use Grows, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 
2010, at A1. Georgia’s commissioner of community health warned that the state may have 
to cut Medicaid reimbursement rates for providers by over sixteen percent. See id. 
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falls in their Medicaid budgets.76 A major reason for this was that en-
rollment in state Medicaid programs was projected to increase by an 
average of 6.6% in fiscal year 2010 (after increasing 5.4% in fiscal year 
2009), primarily due to increased unemployment during the reces-
sion.77 Budget pressure led thirty-three states to cut or freeze reim-
bursement rates in fiscal year 2009; thirty-nine states did so in fiscal year 
2010, and thirty-seven states are planning reimbursement rate restric-
tions for fiscal year 2011.78 One state Medicaid official recently sug-
gested that further cuts to reimbursement rates “could affect access,” 
but admitted “we’re at the point where that may be a secondary con-
sideration.”79 
II. The Equal Access Provision 
 The inclusion of an equal access provision in the Medicaid Act 
suggests that Congress foresaw the temptation states would face to set 
low reimbursement rates for healthcare providers, particularly when 
state budgets were tight.80 The equal access provision, § 30(A), requires 
state Medicaid programs to ensure that Medicaid payment rates are 
both “consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care” and “suf-
ficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are available 
under the plan at least to the extent that such care and services are 
available to the general population in the geographic area.”81 
 Because the equal access provision is included among the require-
ments a state’s Medicaid plan must meet to qualify for federal funding, 
the Secretary of Health and Human Services can withhold funding 
from a state if its Medicaid program fails to comply.82 For example, if a 
state sets reimbursement rates so low that they are inconsistent with pro-
vision of quality care or insufficient to enlist enough providers to treat 
                                                                                                                      
76 See Smith et al., supra note 18, at 26. The federal fiscal year runs from October 1 of 
a given year to September 30 of the next calendar year (which is the year by which the 
fiscal year is identified); for example, fiscal year 2010 began on October 1, 2009 and ended 
on September 30, 2010. See Bill Heniff, Jr., Cong. Research Serv., 98–325, The Fed-
eral Fiscal Year 1 (2003). 
77 See Smith et al., supra note 18, at 6. 
78 See Smith et al., supra note 20, at 6. 
79 Kevin Sack, Rate of Enrollment in Medicaid Rose Rapidly, Report Says, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 
2009, at A1 (quoting Charles Duarte, administrator of Nevada’s Division of Health Care 
Financing and Policy). 
80 See Moncrieff, supra note 8, at 674. 
81 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2006). 
82 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a), 1396c (describing when the Secretary may refuse to make 
payments to a state’s Medicaid program). 
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Medicaid beneficiaries, the Secretary can theoretically withhold federal 
Medicaid funding from that state.83 This remedy, however, has failed to 
provide a significant check on cutbacks to reimbursement rates.84 Medi-
caid recipients are unlikely to pursue this enforcement avenue because 
their access to healthcare would be dramatically reduced by the Secre-
tary’s withholding of federal funds from an already cash-strapped state.85 
The revocation of federal funding is therefore unappealing from the 
perspective of the Secretary and Medicaid beneficiaries alike because it 
would likely result in even lower reimbursement rates and thousands of 
Medicaid recipients either losing some of the services they currently re-
ceive or losing their coverage altogether.86 
 Because the remedy provided by the Medicaid Act has proven in-
adequate and the Act does not include a private right of action whereby 
individuals can enforce its provisions,87 Medicaid recipients and pro-
viders long turned to § 1983 to enforce the requirements of the Medi-
caid Act’s equal access provision.88 
                                                                                                                      
83 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(30)(A), 1396c. 
84 See Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 462 (observing that the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal agency that administers Medicaid on the Secretary’s 
behalf, “is notoriously uninterested in enforcing the terms of State plans against the states; 
instead it seeks cooperation, when it makes demands at all”); Jon Donenberg, Note, Medi-
caid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State Compliance with Federal Availability Require-
ments, 117 Yale L.J. 1498, 1501–02 (2008) (explaining that withholding by the Secretary is 
an ineffective compliance mechanism because (1) enforcement is a low priority for a fed-
eral grant-in-aid agency, like CMS, because its primary role is to help and support partici-
pating states with their programs; (2) cutting off federal funds is likely to destroy a state’s 
Medicaid program; (3) the withholding procedure is long and tedious; and (4) the Secre-
tary and other federal administrators, because they are not accountable to the public, are 
likely to regard maintaining positive relationships with state authorities as more important 
than responding to the problems of Medicaid providers and beneficiaries). 
85 See Jessee, supra note 14, at 826. 
86 See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 52 (1981) (White, J., dis-
senting). Justice White stressed, in the context of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance 
and Bill of Rights Act (which, like the Medicaid Act, provides for withholding funds from 
non-compliant programs), that “a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious conse-
quences to the supposed beneficiaries of the Act.” Id. The same is true in the context of 
the Medicaid Act. See Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 462; Jessee, supra note 14, at 825. 
87 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-149, at 591 (1997) (stating that the Committee’s intent in re-
pealing the Boren Amendment, discussed infra notes 104–108 and accompanying text, was 
that no provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a “will be interpreted as establishing a cause of action 
for hospitals and nursing facilities relative to the adequacy of the rates they receive”). 
88 See, e.g., Evergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 924 (5th Cir. 
2000); Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir. 1996); 
Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996); Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. 
v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 528 (8th Cir. 1993). 
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III. The Rise and Fall of § 1983 Enforcement of the  
Equal Access Provision 
 This Part explains why, although 42 U.S.C. § 1983 once presented 
a workable way of enforcing the equal access provision, in the wake of 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent clarification of the requirements for 
stating a cause of action under § 1983, it is no longer a viable method 
by which to protect provider reimbursement rates.89 Section A intro-
duces § 1983 and its significance for plaintiffs.90 Section B explains that 
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s, Medicaid beneficiaries and 
providers used § 1983 suits to enforce the equal access provision.91 Sec-
tion C discusses how, in 2002, in Gonzaga University v. Doe the Supreme 
Court articulated a narrowed standard for asserting a cause of action 
under § 1983.92 Finally, Section D argues that this narrowed standard 
sounded the death knell for the enforcement of the equal access provi-
sion under § 1983.93 
A. Section 1983 and Statutory Rights 
 Section 1983 permits citizens to bring civil suits against state offi-
cials in order to redress violations of federal rights.94 In 1980, in Maine 
v. Thiboutot, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that § 1983 protects 
federal statutory rights in addition to rights conferred by the Constitu-
tion.95 Thus, plaintiffs can use § 1983 to enforce a right conferred by a 
federal statute that does not, itself, include a private right of action—as 
is true of the Medicaid Act.96 
 After creating some confusion as to whether Thiboutot applied to 
legislation enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause power,97 in Bless-
ing v. Freestone, in 1997, the Court clarified the test for determining when 
a federal law confers a right enforceable through § 1983.98 Under Bless-
                                                                                                                      
89 See infra notes 94–128 and accompanying text. 
90 See infra notes 94–102 and accompanying text. 
91 See infra notes 103–112 and accompanying text. 
92 See infra notes 113–117 and accompanying text. 
93 See infra notes 118–128 and accompanying text. 
94 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006); see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
95 See 448 U.S. at 4. 
96 See id. at 5; Donenberg, supra note 84, at 1516. 
97 See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1992) (holding that the Adoption Assis-
tance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 does not confer rights to individuals enforceable un-
der § 1983); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s claim that the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 
1975 conferred rights enforceable via § 1983). 
98 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997). 
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ing, to successfully enforce a right conferred by a federal statute, a plain-
tiff need only show that: (1) Congress intended for the statutory provi-
sion at issue to benefit the plaintiff; (2) the right allegedly conferred by 
the statue is not so “vague and amorphous” that judicial competence 
would be strained by its enforcement; and (3) the statute “unambigu-
ously impose[s] a binding obligation on the States.”99 If a plaintiff meets 
this test, it is presumed that the statutory right can be enforced under 
§ 1983.100 This presumption can be rebutted, however, by a showing that 
Congress foreclosed a remedy under § 1983.101 Congress can do so ex-
plicitly, by statutorily forbidding resort to § 1983, or impliedly, by enact-
ing an enforcement scheme that is irreconcilable with § 1983.102 
B. Pre-2002 Success for Medicaid Act Enforcement 
 The U.S. Supreme Court held for the first time in Wilder v. Virginia 
Hospital Ass’n in 1990 that a provision of the Medicaid Act created a 
federal right enforceable under § 1983.103 The case was brought by 
healthcare providers who argued that Virginia’s Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates were not reasonable, as required by the now-repealed Boren 
Amendment104 to the Medicaid Act.105 Wilder announced that the 
Boren Amendment gave healthcare providers a substantive right to 
“reasonable and adequate” reimbursement rates, which they could en-
force under § 1983.106 It reasoned that the amendment conferred an 
enforceable federal right because: (1) providers were clearly the in-
tended beneficiaries of the amendment; (2) the amendment was cast in 
                                                                                                                      
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 341. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990). 
104 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994) (repealed 1997). The Boren Amendment re-
quired states to set provider reimbursement rates that were “reasonable and adequate” to 
meet the costs incurred by “efficiently and economically operated facilities.” Id. Its lan-
guage was similar to that of the equal access provision, but its requirements were slightly 
less flexible. See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly (Independent Living III ), 
572 F.3d 644, 654–55 (9th Cir.), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009), and 
petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-958); Ark. Med. Soc’y, 
Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 525 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he equal access provision is very 
analogous to the Boren Amendment examined in Wilder; they are similar not only in func-
tion but also in the specific language employed.”). Congress repealed the Boren Amend-
ment in 1997 with the express intention of reversing Wilder and, additionally, preventing 
further provider challenges to Medicaid reimbursement rates. See H.R. Rep. No. 105-149, 
at 591 (1997). 
105 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 503–04. 
106 Id. at 509–10. 
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“mandatory rather than precatory terms”;107 and (3) federal funding 
was explicitly conditioned on compliance with its requirements.108 
 In the wake of Wilder, federal circuit courts across the nation ruled 
that Medicaid beneficiaries and providers had a private right of action 
under § 1983 to enforce various provisions of the Medicaid Act, includ-
ing the equal access provision.109 Equal access suits brought under 
§ 1983 had some success in preventing state Medicaid programs from 
making cutbacks to reimbursement rates.110 Despite the loose § 1983 
standard articulated in Blessing, however, the case law grew increasingly 
fractured after 1997 because of Congress’s repeal of the Boren Amend-
ment.111 Legislative history suggests that Congress specifically intended 
the Amendment’s repeal to prevent Medicaid providers from bringing 
reimbursement rate suits under § 1983 and to thereby increase the 
flexibility of state Medicaid programs in setting reimbursement rates.112 
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. at 512. 
108 See id. at 510, 512. 
109 See, e.g., Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1005 (1st Cir. 
1996) (concluding that Medicaid providers have standing to sue under § 1983 to enforce 
§ 30(A)); Methodist Hosps., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996) (deciding 
that Medicaid providers have a private right of action, under § 1983, to enforce § 30(A)); 
Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319–20 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that Medicaid recipi-
ents can enforce Medicaid’s early periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services 
(“EPSDT”) provisions under § 1983); Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 527–28 (holding that Medicaid 
beneficiaries and providers can enforce § 30(A) under § 1983). 
110 See Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 521 (concluding that a reimbursement rate reduction by Ar-
kansas’s Medicaid program violated § 30(A) because the impact of the rate reduction on 
access, economy, efficiency, and quality of care had not been considered). But see Sullivan, 
91 F.3d at 1029 (deciding that plaintiffs failed to show reimbursement rates set by Indi-
ana’s Medicaid program violated § 30(A)); cf. Bullen, 93 F.3d at 1011 (remanding for fur-
ther proceeding on plaintiff’s substantive claims). 
111 See, e.g., Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun, 283 F.3d 531, 541–42 (3d Cir. 2002) (con-
cluding that pharmacists, as providers, cannot bring a § 1983 claim to enforce § 30(A)); Ev-
ergreen Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927–29 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that Medicaid beneficiaries, but not providers, can enforce § 30(A) under § 1983) (abroga-
tion by Gonzaga recognized in Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 509 F.3d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 
2007) (noting that Gonzaga “abrogated Evergreen in respect to such suits by recipients while 
confirming it insofar as it disallows § 1983 actions by providers under the Equal Access provi-
sion”)). 
112 See H.R. Rep. No. 105-149, at 591 (1997) (“It is the Committee’s intention that, fol-
lowing enactment of this Act, neither this nor any other provision of [42 U.S.C. § 1396a] 
will be interpreted as establishing a cause of action for hospitals and nursing facilities rela-
tive to the adequacy of the rates they receive.”); see also Long Term Care Pharmacy Alliance 
v. Ferguson, 362 F.3d 50, 58 (1st Cir. 2004). 
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C. Gonzaga Articulates a New Standard 
 Enforcement of the equal access provision via § 1983 was further 
complicated when the U.S. Supreme Court refined the Blessing test in 
Gonzaga University v. Doe in 2002.113 In Gonzaga, the Court concluded 
that a student could not sue a private university under § 1983 in order 
to enforce the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 be-
cause the Act does not create the sort of personal right that is enforce-
able under § 1983.114 Emphasizing that only “rights,” and not vague 
“benefits” or “interests,” are enforceable under § 1983, the Court held 
that in order for Blessing’s first prong (congressional intent that the 
statutory provision benefit the plaintiff) to be satisfied, the statute must 
“unambiguously” confer a federal right.115 Thus, in order to be en-
forceable under § 1983, a statute must contain “rights-creating terms”116 
and be focused on benefiting an individual plaintiff, rather than on 
institutional policies or practices in the aggregate.117 
D. Post-Gonzaga Downfall 
 The Court in Gonzaga explicitly distinguished Wilder and did not 
profess to abrogate its holding that Medicaid providers could use 
§ 1983 to enforce the Boren Amendment.118 Nonetheless, in light of 
Gonzaga’s holding that a federal statutory right must be “unambigu-
ously” conferred in order to support a cause of action under § 1983,119 
federal circuit courts have tended to accept § 1983 enforcement of 
Medicaid provisions that reference “individuals” or “families”120 but re-
ject the enforceability of those with broader, more general language.121 
                                                                                                                      
113 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 282–83 (2002) (reaffirming the Blessing test 
and refining the first of its three prongs). 
114 See id. at 276. 
115 See id. at 282–83. 
116 Id. at 284 (listing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 as examples of statutes that contain such “rights-creating” lan-
guage because they are “phrased in terms of the persons benefited”). 
117 See id. at 288. 
118 See id. at 280–81. 
119 See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. 
120 See Bobroff, supra note 37, at 62–64. For example, circuit courts have repeatedly 
held that 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) is still enforceable via § 1983 because, unlike the equal 
access provision, § 1396a(a)(10) clearly conveys an individual right. See, e.g., Watson v. 
Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1159–60 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 1396a(a)(10) “creates a 
right enforceable by section 1983”); S.D. ex. rel. Dickson v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that § 1396a(a)(10) contains “precisely the sort of ‘rights-creating’ 
language identified in Gonzaga as critical to demonstrating a congressional intent to estab-
lish a new right”); Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. Richman, 367 F.3d 180, 183 (3d Cir. 2004) (hold-
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 With only one exception, every circuit court that has considered 
the equal access provision after Gonzaga has held that the provision is 
not enforceable under § 1983.122 For example, in 2004 in Long Term 
Care Pharmacy Alliance v. Ferguson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit held that pharmaceutical providers could not use § 1983 to 
challenge reimbursement rates as violating the equal access provision 
because the provision does not create “explicit rights” for providers.123 
In so doing, the court reversed its own earlier holding that the equal 
access provision is enforceable via § 1983.124 It reasoned that, under 
Gonzaga, clear statutory language is required for the creation of private 
rights enforceable via § 1983 and the equal access provision lacks such 
language.125 
 In light of the growing number of circuit courts holding that § 1983 
cannot be used to enforce the equal access provision and thereby assure 
adequate reimbursement rates for Medicaid providers, there is reason to 
worry that “Medicaid is metamorphosing into a right without a rem-
edy.”126 The timing of this development is particularly troubling because, 
due to tight state budgets produced by the recession and the dramatic 
swelling of state Medicaid rolls brought about both by the recession and 
national healthcare reform, protecting provider reimbursement rates is a 
                                                                                                                      
ing that § 1396a(a)(10) “unambiguously confer[s]” a right “vindicable under § 1983”). 
The relevant portion of this section of the Medicaid Act requires that a state plan for 
medical assistance “provide . . . for making medical assistance available . . . to all [eligible] 
individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2006) (emphasis added). 
121 See, e.g., Hawkins, 509 F.3d at 703 (concluding, in light of Gonzaga, that § 30(A) is 
not enforceable under § 1983 because it does not unambiguously confer individual private 
rights); Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that, based upon a Gonzaga analysis, § 30(A) “does not create a federal right en-
forceable under § 1983”); Westside Mothers v. Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 542–43 (6th Cir. 
2006) (determining that § 30(A) “has an aggregate focus rather than an individual focus” 
and its “broad and nonspecific” language is “ill-suited to judicial remedy”); Sanchez v. 
Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the “text and structure 
of § 30(A) simply do not focus on an individual recipient’s or provider’s right to benefits” 
as required by Gonzaga, neither Medicaid recipients nor providers can enforce the provi-
sion under § 1983); Ferguson, 362 F.3d at 58–59 (concluding that, under Gonzaga, § 30(A) 
does not confer a private right of action to providers such as pharmacies). But see Pediatric 
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1015–16 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(adhering, in spite of Gonzaga, to the court’s prior precedent that § 30(A) creates a right 
enforceable under § 1983 for Medicaid beneficiaries and providers), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142, 1142 (2007). 
122 Compare cases cited supra note 121, with Pediatric Specialty Care, 443 F.3d at 1015–16. 
123 362 F.3d at 58. 
124 Id. at 58–59 (recognizing that Gonzaga overruled Bullen, 93 F.3d 997). 
125 Id. 
126 Huberfeld, supra note 6, at 417. 
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more critical concern than ever before.127 Therefore, a recent holding by 
the Ninth Circuit, suggesting that the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause 
may provide an alternative way for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries 
to enforce the equal access provision, merits thorough examination.128 
IV. The Rise of Enforcement via the Supremacy Clause? 
 In 2008, in Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. 
Shewry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first 
federal circuit court to suggest that an implied cause of action under 
the Supremacy Clause could provide an alternative way to enforce 
Medicaid’s equal access provision.129 Although the Ninth Circuit was 
the first circuit court to reach this conclusion in the context of § 30(A), 
its holding has a solid basis in decades of U.S. Supreme Court decisions 
on the issue of federal preemption, generally,130 and is supported by 
other circuit court decisions in cases involving preemption of state law 
by other provisions of the Medicaid Act.131 
 This Part explains how a federal preemption claim is an alternative 
way for Medicaid providers and beneficiaries to enjoin the implementa-
tion of significant cutbacks to reimbursement rates by state Medicaid 
programs.132 Section A presents a brief overview of the federal preemp-
tion doctrine.133 Section B explains that the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly assumed that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied cause of 
action for plaintiffs asserting a federal preemption claim.134 Section C 
explores how federal circuit courts have received preemption claims 
                                                                                                                      
127 See Sack, supra note 79; supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
128 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry (Independent Living I ), 543 F.3d 1047, 
1048–49 (9th Cir.), opinion issued by (Independent Living II ), 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly 
(Independent Living III ), 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d 725 
(9th Cir. 2009), and petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-
958). 
129 See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry (Independent Living I ), 543 F.3d 1047, 
1048–49 (9th Cir.), opinion issued by (Independent Living II ), 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), 
cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 3891211 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly 
(Independent Living III ), 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 F.3d 725 
(9th Cir. 2009), and petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) (No. 09-
958). 
130 See infra notes 140–158 and accompanying text. 
131 See infra notes 159–164 and accompanying text. 
132 See infra notes 137–230 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 137–139 and accompanying text. 
134 See infra notes 140–158 and accompanying text. 
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asserting that state laws conflict with the Medicaid Act.135 And Section 
D dissects Independent Living Center and surveys its impact within the 
Ninth Circuit and across the nation.136 
A. The Supremacy Clause 
 Under the Supremacy Clause, from which the preemption doc-
trine is derived, state laws are invalid if they are contrary to or interfere 
with federal law.137 There are two basic types of preemption: explicit 
and implied.138 If an allegedly preemptive federal statute does not con-
tain explicitly preemptive language, implied preemption may still be 
found either in the case of (1) field preemption, where the federal 
regulatory scheme is so pervasive that no room is left for supplemental 
state regulation in that area, or (2) conflict preemption, where it is im-
possible to comply with both the state and federal regulations or the 
state law presents “an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”139 
B. Preemption and the Supreme Court 
 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never said so explicitly, it 
has repeatedly assumed that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied 
cause of action for plaintiffs alleging that a state law is preempted by a 
conflicting federal law.140 For example, in 1983, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 
Inc., the Court unanimously held that federal courts have jurisdiction 
under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, to resolve cases in 
which a plaintiff seeks prospective injunctive relief from a state statute 
by alleging that it conflicts with—and is therefore preempted by—a 
federal law.141 The plaintiffs in Shaw were employers who claimed New 
York laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and re-
quiring employers to pay sick leave benefits to women who were unable 
to work due to pregnancy were invalid because they were preempted by 
the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ER-
                                                                                                                      
135 See infra notes 159–164 and accompanying text. 
136 See infra notes 165–222 and accompanying text. 
137 See U.S. Const. art. VI; Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 
(1992). 
138 See Gade, 505 U.S. at 98. 
139 Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see David Sloss, Constitu-
tional Remedies for Statutory Violations, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 355, 390–91 (2004). 
140 See infra notes 141–158 and accompanying text; see also Bobroff, supra note 37, at 29; 
Sloss, supra note 139, at 390–91. 
141 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). 
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ISA).142 In deciding the case, the Court dealt only summarily with 
plaintiffs’ right to bring the suit in federal court.143 Without consider-
ing whether ERISA gave the plaintiffs a private cause of action, the 
Court matter-of-factly observed in a footnote that “[i]t is beyond dis-
pute that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits to enjoin state offi-
cials from interfering with federal rights. . . . This Court, of course, fre-
quently has resolved pre-emption disputes in a similar jurisdictional 
posture.”144 Thus, the Court implicitly held that plaintiffs can obtain 
injunctive relief, via the Supremacy Clause, from a state law that con-
flicts with a federal statute even if the federal statute does not contain a 
private cause of action or confer a right enforceable under § 1983.145 
 In 2002, during the same term it decided Gonzaga University v. Doe, 
the Court reaffirmed its lenient approach to federal preemption 
suits.146 In Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, a telecom-
munications company sued officials of Maryland’s Public Service 
Commission, asserting that the Commission’s decision on compensa-
tion rights conflicted with, and was therefore preempted by, federal 
law.147 Citing Shaw, the Court held that it had jurisdiction under § 1331 
to resolve the federal preemption claim.148 But the Court found that it 
was not necessary to decide whether the allegedly preemptive federal 
statute contains a private cause of action in order to reach the merits of 
the case.149 As long as a valid cause of action is arguable (because the 
allegedly conflicting federal law does not indicate an intent to withdraw 
federal jurisdiction under § 1331) and the claim of preemption is not 
“wholly insubstantial or frivolous,” federal courts have jurisdiction to 
decide whether a state action is preempted by federal law.150 In so hold-
ing, the Court implicitly decided that whether the allegedly preemptive 
statute contains a private cause of action is immaterial to the reviewabil-
ity of a federal preemption claim.151 
                                                                                                                      
142 Id. at 88. 
143 See id. at 96 n.14. 
144 Id.; see Sloss, supra note 139, at 377–78. 
145 See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14. 
146 Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002). 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. (noting that “[w]e need express no opinion” on the Commission’s argument 
that the Court did not have jurisdiction to resolve the case because the allegedly preemp-
tive federal act did not contain a private cause of action to challenge the Commission’s 
order). 
150 Id. at 643 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). 
151 See id.; see also Bobroff, supra note 37, at 29. 
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 Since 2002, the Court has decided two cases involving preemption 
and the Medicaid Act.152 In both, as in Verizon and Shaw, the Court’s ma-
jority opinion reached the merits of the case without deciding whether 
the allegedly preemptive federal statute created a private cause of ac-
tion.153 In 2003, in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. 
Walsh, an association of drug manufacturers challenged Maine’s pre-
scription drug rebate program as preempted by the federal Medicaid 
Act.154 A majority of the Court, without any discussion of the source of 
the plaintiffs’ cause of action, held that the drug manufacturers had not 
sufficiently shown that Maine’s rebate program conflicted with the 
Medicaid Act.155 In 2006, in Arkansas Department of Health & Human Ser-
vices v. Ahlborn, a Medicaid recipient argued that the federal Medicaid 
Act preempted Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services’ 
(“ADHS”) assertion of a claim against proceeds she received from the 
settlement of a personal injury lawsuit.156 The Supreme Court made no 
mention of the source of the plaintiff’s cause of action or the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but concluded that ADHS’s claim was preempted because it 
conflicted with the Medicaid Act.157 
 Although the Court did not explain in either of these cases whether 
the plaintiff’s cause of action came from the Medicaid Act or the Consti-
tution, and the Court has yet to explicitly hold that the Supremacy 
Clause creates an implied right of action for preemption cases, these 
cases strongly indicate that the Court is more receptive to suits brought 
under the preemption doctrine than under § 1983.158 
                                                                                                                      
152 Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 274, 292 (2006); 
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 650, 667–68 (2003). 
153 See Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 274, 292; Walsh, 538 U.S. at 650, 667–68. 
154 See 538 U.S. at 650. 
155 See id. at 667–68. In separate concurring opinions, however, Justices Scalia and 
Thomas both argued that private individuals cannot sue under the Supremacy Clause to 
enjoin state laws that violate provisions of the Medicaid Act. See id. at 675 (Scalia, J., con-
curring); id. at 682 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
156 See 547 U.S. at 274. 
157 See id. at 292. 
158 See id.; Walsh, 538 U.S. at 667–68; see also Sloss, supra note 139, at 390–91 (“[T]he 
Court is willing to grant relief in Shaw preemption cases even if the plaintiff lacks a private 
right of action under the preemptive federal statute, and without regard to whether the 
statute creates individual rights that are enforceable pursuant to § 1983.”). 
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C. Preemption and the Circuit Courts 
 Federal circuit courts have been similarly receptive to preemption 
suits.159 In the wake of Gonzaga and Verizon, several circuit courts have 
concluded that plaintiffs can challenge, under the Supremacy Clause, 
state laws that conflict with federal statutes even when the plaintiffs 
would not be able to do so under § 1983.160 
 Furthermore, in 2006 in Lankford v. Sherman, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit clearly indicated that it is receptive to cases 
alleging that a state law is preempted by a provision of the Medicaid Act, 
even though it cannot be enforced under § 1983.161 In Lankford, a case 
in which disabled adult Medicaid recipients alleged that a state regula-
tion was preempted, the Eighth Circuit held that although the Medicaid 
Act’s reasonable standards provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), does not 
create a right enforceable under § 1983, it likely preempted a state regu-
lation restricting the availability of durable medical equipment.162 
 The Ninth Circuit, however, was the first to suggest that the Su-
premacy Clause could provide an alternative way to enforce Medicaid’s 
equal access provision.163 Its decisions in Independent Living Center and 
related cases, which will be explored in the next Section, leave no 
doubt as to the Ninth Circuit’s full support for the proposition that 
plaintiffs can successfully sue under the Supremacy Clause to challenge 
Medicaid reimbursement rates as preempted by § 30(A).164 
                                                                                                                      
159 See, e.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509, 513 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that 
“[p]reemption claims are analyzed under a different test than section 1983 claims” and 
concluding that plaintiffs, disabled adult Medicaid recipients, had demonstrated that a 
state regulation restricting the availability of durable medical equipment was likely pre-
empted by Medicaid’s reasonable standards provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2006)); 
Planned Parenthood of Hous. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 333–35 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(holding “the rule that there is an implied right of action to enjoin state or local regula-
tion that is preempted by a federal statutory or constitutional provision—and that such an 
action falls within the federal question jurisdiction—is well-established” and finding that 
rule unchanged by Gonzaga); Qwest Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 380 F.3d 1258, 1266–67 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that although the plaintiff, a telecommunications provider, could not 
challenge a state ordinance under § 1983 because the federal Telecommunications Act 
does not confer any private right upon individuals, the plaintiff could challenge the ordi-
nance, under the Supremacy Clause, as preempted by the Telecommunications Act). 
160 See, e.g., Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509, 513; Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 333–35; Qwest, 380 F.3d 
at 1266–67; see also supra note 159 (summarizing the holdings of these cases). 
161 See 451 F.3d at 513. 
162 See id. 
163 Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1052. 
164 See infra notes 165–230 and accompanying text. 
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D. Independent Living Center: Preemption and § 30(A) 
 In April 2008, in Independent Living Center, California healthcare 
advocates, pharmacies, and Medicaid recipients and providers (collec-
tively, “ILC”) sued the Director of California’s Department of Health 
Care Services (“the Director”), Sandra Shewry, seeking to enjoin im-
plementation of California Assembly Bill 5 (“AB 5”).165 The bill, which 
was scheduled to take effect on July 1, 2008, cut by ten percent pay-
ments to healthcare providers by California’s Medicaid program (Medi-
Cal).166 ILC sued under the Supremacy Clause, arguing that AB 5 is in-
valid because its mandated rate cut conflicts with the federal Medicaid 
Act’s equal access provision.167 Although ILC brought the action in 
state court, the Director quickly removed it to federal court under fed-
eral question jurisdiction.168 
 ILC advanced two arguments in support of its conflict preemption 
claim.169 First, ILC argued that the rate cut would lead so few providers 
to enlist in the Medi-Cal program that Medi-Cal recipients would have 
dramatically less access to medical care and services than is available to 
California’s general population, a clear breach of the Medicaid Act’s 
equal access provision.170 Payments by Medi-Cal were so low, even be-
fore AB 5, that 45% of primary care physicians, 50% of specialists, and 
90% of dentists in California refused to accept Medi-Cal patients or 
participate in the Medi-Cal program.171 Implementation of AB 5’s rate 
cut, ILC contended, would lead even more providers to reduce services 
to Medi-Cal recipients or stop participating in Medi-Cal entirely.172 
 Second, ILC argued that AB 5 was preempted by § 30(A) because 
the legislature had not complied with procedural requirements that the 
Ninth Circuit had previously construed § 30(A) to mandate.173 In an 
earlier case involving § 1983 and § 30(A), the Ninth Circuit held that a 
                                                                                                                      
165 Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1052; see Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 14105.19(b)(1) 
(West 2008). 
166 Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1053. Specifically, AB 5 reduces payments to 
healthcare providers participating in Medi-Cal’s fee-for-service plan (including physicians, 
dentists, and pharmacies) by 10%; payments to managed care plans by the actuarial 
equivalent of a 10% reduction; and payments to non-contract acute care hospitals by 10%. 
Id. 
167 Id. 
168 See id. at 1053–54. 
169 See id. at 1053. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 See Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1053. 
173 See id. 
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state Medicaid program must rely on “responsible cost studies” when 
setting Medicaid reimbursement rates and generally must set rates that 
have a “reasonable relationship” to the cost of quality healthcare.174 ILC 
contended that, in violation of this interpretation of § 30(A), the state 
had failed to consider whether the ten percent reduction would be 
consistent with quality care and neglected to examine cost studies.175 
The state’s only apparent consideration, ILC contended, was address-
ing “the fiscal emergency declared by the Governor” and “imple-
ment[ing] cost containment measures affecting health services, at the 
earliest possible time.”176 
1. District Court Denies Injunction 
 The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, de-
spite noting that it was “acutely cognizant of the potential adverse con-
sequences of the ten percent rate reduction,” denied ILC’s motion for 
a preliminary injunction in June 2008.177 The court explained that 
ILC’s case would likely fail on the merits, in the wake of Gonzaga, be-
cause ILC has no “federal rights under § 30(A).”178 
 The district court rejected ILC’s contention that it had an implied 
right of action arising out of the Supremacy Clause.179 Only three cate-
gories of Shaw preemption claims have been allowed, the district court 
stated: (1) where a plaintiff alleges that a state law requires him to vio-
late a federal law; (2) where a plaintiff claims that a state law, which is 
preempted by a federal law, will restrict his conduct; and (3) where a 
plaintiff contends that “federally created rights” are interfered with by a 
state law.180 Because ILC’s preemption claims did not fit into any of 
these Shaw categories, the district court reasoned that ILC’s claims had 
very little chance of succeeding on the merits.181 
                                                                                                                      
174 Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1496 (9th Cir. 1997). 
175 See Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1053. 
176 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
177 Independent Living Center, 2008 WL 4298223, at *5. A plaintiff obtains injunctive re-
lief by establishing “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer ir-
reparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his 
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 
651 (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008)). 
178 Independent Living Center, 2008 WL 4298223, at *5. 
179 See id. at *4–5. 
180 Id. at *4. Although the district court cited cases representing each of these three 
“categories,” it gave no hint as to where it had discovered or derived the rule that these 
were the only situations in which Shaw applied. See id. 
181 See id. at *4–5. 
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 Strangely, rather than relying on Shaw and its progeny, the bulk of 
the district court’s analysis drew primarily on Ninth Circuit decisions 
involving the equal access provision and § 1983, even though ILC sued 
under the Supremacy Clause.182 Thus, the seemingly confused district 
court applied Gonzaga’s narrowed test for § 1983 claims to ILC’s pre-
emption claim and concluded that ILC failed to sufficiently state a 
claim for relief.183 
2. Ninth Circuit Remands for Consideration on the Merits 
 ILC successfully appealed to the Ninth Circuit for emergency relief 
from this decision.184 On July 11, 2008, a three-judge panel of the Ninth 
Circuit heard argument and issued an order vacating the district court’s 
ruling and remanding the case for consideration of the merits.185 In its 
order, the Ninth Circuit explicitly held that a plaintiff could bring a 
preemption claim like ILC’s without an express right of action.186 It is 
well-established, the Ninth Circuit explained, that a plaintiff can sue 
under the Supremacy Clause to enjoin the implementation of a state 
law that conflicts with a federal law “regardless of whether the federal 
statute at issue confers an express ‘right’ or cause of action on the 
plaintiff.”187 The district court’s decision was vacated because it was en-
tirely based on the “legal error” that ILC could not seek injunctive re-
lief under the Supremacy Clause without having an individual right 
arising from the Medicaid Act.188 
 In a longer opinion, issued in September 2008, the Ninth Circuit 
elaborated on its July order.189 In addition to more fully explaining 
                                                                                                                      
182 See id. at *3–4 (discussing Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(holding that neither Medicaid recipients nor providers could enforce § 30(A) via § 1983 
because § 30(A) does not create an “individual right” as required by Gonzaga)). 
183 See id. at *5. 
184 Independent Living I, 543 F.3d at 1048–49. 
185 Id. at 1049. 
186 Id. at 1048–49. 
187 Id. (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983); Lankford, 451 
F.3d at 509–10; Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 331–35; Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers v. 
Massachusetts, 377 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2004); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thomp-
son, 362 F.3d 817, 819 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of 
Banks & Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762, 765 (7th Cir. 2002); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. 
Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 73 (1st Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. 
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003); St. Thomas–St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n v. Virgin Is-
lands, 218 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2000); Village of Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 
n.4 (2d Cir. 1999); Burgio & Campofelice, Inc. v. N.Y. Dep’t of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000, 1005–
07 (2d Cir. 1997); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45 F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
188 Id. at 1049. 
189 See Indep. Living II, 543 F.3d at 1055. 
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what is required for a plaintiff to state a preemption claim, the Ninth 
Circuit dismissed the district court’s analytical framework and rejected 
arguments advanced by the Director.190 In this opinion, however, the 
Ninth Circuit continued to decline to weigh in on the merits of ILC’s 
preemption claim.191 
 In the longer opinion, the Ninth Circuit elaborated upon its ear-
lier holding that a private individual may seek injunctive relief under 
the Supremacy Clause and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.192 To bring a preemption 
suit, the court explained, a plaintiff need only (1) allege that a state law 
is preempted by federal law and (2) satisfy the traditional standing re-
quirements.193 This conclusion, the court explained, was supported by 
decades of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, such as Shaw, which the 
Ninth Circuit interpreted as standing for the general principle that “the 
Supremacy Clause provides a cause of action to enjoin implementation 
of allegedly unlawful state legislation.”194 Thus, the court held that be-
cause (1) ILC contended that the rate cuts violate § 30(A) and are thus 
unlawful and (2) the rate cuts are causing injury to at least one of the 
plaintiffs and the other Article III standing requirements are met, the 
suit can go forward.195 
 The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s suggestion that ILC’s 
claim for injunctive relief, brought under the Supremacy Clause, must 
meet the same standards as a suit brought under § 1983.196 The Ninth 
Circuit explained that a plaintiff suing under the Supremacy Clause for 
prospective injunctive relief does not need to assert a federal right in the 
same way that Gonzaga holds a plaintiff must assert an “unambiguously 
conferred right” to bring a suit under § 1983.197 Observing that “the 
well-established rule in both this court and in other circuits is precisely 
                                                                                                                      
190 See id. at 1055, 1057, 1061–62. 
191 See id. at 1066. 
192 See id. at 1056–57, 1065–66. The Ninth Circuit stressed that “Shaw did not give rise 
to some unique line of ‘Shaw preemption’ cases, but merely reaffirmed the traditional rule 
that injunctive relief is presumptively available in federal court to enjoin state officers from 
implementing a law allegedly preempted under the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 1057. 
193 See id. at 1058 (“[A] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause 
on the basis of federal preemption . . . need only satisfy traditional standing require-
ments.”). 
194 Id. at 1056. 
195 Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1065–66. 
196 See id. at 1055 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly entertained claims for injunc-
tive relief based on federal preemption, without requiring that the standards for bringing 
suit under § 1983 be met, and without intimating that such claims must fit into one of 
three categories or ‘circumstances’ in order to be cognizable.”). 
197 See id. at 1058, 1062. 
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the opposite,”198 the Ninth Circuit reasoned that to hold otherwise 
would require it to apply the test used to determine whether a plaintiff 
can seek relief via § 1983 to preemption suits.199 This would clearly be 
improper, because although the U.S. Supreme Court has recently made 
the test for bringing a damages action under § 1983 stricter, it has con-
tinued to reaffirm the availability of a suit for injunctive relief under the 
Supremacy Clause where a federal law preempts a state one.200 
 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit rejected the district court’s suggestion 
that Shaw preemption cases are limited to three “categories.”201 Noting 
that it was unaware of any precedent for so limiting Shaw and observing 
that the Director had failed to suggest any, the Ninth Circuit dismissed 
the argument entirely.202 
 The Director’s contention that a preemption claim brought under 
a federal Spending Clause statute, like the Medicaid Act, should be 
treated differently from non-Spending Clause legislation was also re-
jected by the Ninth Circuit.203 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth 
Circuit relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Walsh, 
which reached the merits of the pharmaceutical manufacturers’ claim 
that a Maine statute was preempted by the federal Medicaid Act.204 The 
Ninth Circuit interpreted this result as suggesting that federal laws have 
                                                                                                                      
198 Id. at 1058–59. For support, the court cited cases from the First, Second, Third, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits holding that, regardless of whether the allegedly pre-
emptive federal statute creates a “right,” private parties may bring preemption suits seek-
ing injunctive relief. See id. (citing Qwest, 280 F.3d at 1266; Local Union No. 12004, 377 F.3d 
at 75; Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers, 308 F.3d at 765; St. Thomas–St. John Hotel & Tourism Ass’n, 
218 F.3d at 241; Welch’s, 170 F.3d at 124 n.4; Burgio & Campofelice, Inc., 107 F.3d at 1005–07; 
First Nat’l Bank of E. Ark. v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 776 n.3 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
199 See id. at 1062 (“[B]oth the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal have consis-
tently rejected attempts to extend this analysis to claims for purely prospective injunctive 
relief under the Supremacy Clause, rendering the ‘rights’ requirement inapplicable to 
ILC’s claims in this case.”). For support, the court cited recent cases from the Fifth and 
Eighth Circuits. See id. at 1062–63 (citing Lankford, 451 F.3d at 509; Sanchez, 403 F.3d at 
335). 
200 See id. at 1062. 
201 See Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1057. The three categories identified by the dis-
trict court were (1) where a plaintiff alleges that a state law requires him to violate a fed-
eral law; (2) where a plaintiff claims that a state law that is preempted by a federal law will 
restrict his conduct; and (3) where a plaintiff contends that “federally created rights” are 
interfered with by a state law. See id.; supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
202 See Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1055. 
203 See id. at 1061–62. 
204 See id. at 1059–60 (discussing Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 ). 
2010] Preemption Challenges to Medicaid Reimbursement Cuts 1611 
preemptive power, regardless of the authority under which they were 
enacted by Congress.205 
3. District Court Grants Preliminary Injunction 
 On remand, the district court faced the problem of interpreting 
the equal access provision in order to determine whether ILC had 
shown sufficient likelihood of success to merit a preliminary injunc-
tion.206 The district court decided that although the Ninth Circuit had 
determined, in the wake of Gonzaga, that § 30(A) could no longer be 
enforced via § 1983, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 30(A), an-
nounced in 1997 in Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe, a § 1983 case, still con-
trolled.207 Thus, the district court proceeded with its analysis of ILC’s 
likelihood of success on the merits under Belshe, which held that § 30(A) 
requires (1) provider reimbursements to be “consistent with efficiency, 
economy, and quality of care” and “sufficient to enlist enough providers 
to provide access to Medicaid recipients” and (2) the state Medicaid 
program to use “responsible cost studies” containing “reliable data” 
when setting those rates.208 
 Based on this interpretation of § 30(A), the district court con-
cluded that ILC had demonstrated that its preemption claim had a like-
lihood of success on the merits because (1) reports, declarations, and 
studies submitted by ILC established a risk of irreparable injury to 
healthcare access and (2) the Director could not show that the De-
partment had considered the impact of the payment cut on healthcare 
quality or access.209 Thus, the district court granted a preliminary in-
junction, enjoining implementation of the rate reduction.210 
                                                                                                                      
205 See id. at 1061. The court acknowledged in a footnote, however, that Justices Scalia 
and Thomas had expressed skepticism of preemption suits brought under Spending 
Clause statutes like the Medicaid Act in concurring opinions in Walsh. See id. at 1060 n.12. 
206 See Independent Living Center, 2008 WL 3891211, at *2–4. 
207 See id. at *4 (citing Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1496). 
208 Id. at *3–4 (quoting Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1496). 
209 See id. at *4, *9, *11. 
210 Id. at *11. The preliminary injunction was granted with respect to the reduction in 
payments for Medi-Cal’s fee-for-service program, but denied with respect to the managed 
care plans and non-acute care hospitals because no risk of irreparable injury to those ser-
vices was shown. See id. The district court subsequently, in response to a motion filed by the 
Director arguing that the original order violated the Eleventh Amendment, amended the 
preliminary injunction so that it granted only prospective relief. See Independent Living III, 
572 F.3d at 648, 650. 
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4. Ninth Circuit Upholds Preliminary Injunction 
 When the Director appealed this order, the Ninth Circuit refused 
to rehear the case en banc, reaffirmed its earlier holding that ILC had 
stated a cognizable claim under the Supremacy Clause, and upheld the 
preliminary injunction granted by the district court.211 
 Significantly, the Ninth Circuit noted that the Belshe court’s interpre-
tation of § 30(A) is just as persuasive in preemption cases as it had been 
in § 1983 cases.212 The court reasoned that Belshe “clearly controls” in 
both cases because determining the underlying purpose of the allegedly 
preemptive federal law is the first step in a conflict preemption analysis as 
well as the central focus of Belshe’s interpretation of § 30(A).213 
 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had not 
abused its discretion in finding that ILC had demonstrated a sufficient 
likelihood of success on the merits to be granted a preliminary injunc-
tion.214 Applying Belshe’s interpretation of § 30(A) to the facts, the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that “the Director violated § 30(A) when he 
implemented the rate reductions mandated by AB 5” because he failed 
to rely on any cost studies in setting Medicaid rates.215 
5. The U.S. Supreme Court and Other Plaintiffs Take Note 
 The U.S. Supreme Court, in June 2009, denied the Director’s peti-
tion for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether Medicaid providers 
and recipients state a valid cause of action under the Supremacy Clause 
by alleging that a state law reducing provider reimbursement rates con-
flicts with § 30(A).216 A subsequent petition for certiorari is currently 
pending before the Court, however.217 In this petition, the Director 
asked the Court to decide the same issue presented in the 2009 petition 
                                                                                                                      
211 See Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 648, 650–51. 
212 See id. at 652–53. 
213 See id. at 653 (“In both cases, the central question is the purpose underlying § 30(A), 
and as to that question, [Belshe] clearly controls.”). 
214 See id. at 657. 
215 Id. at 652. The Ninth Circuit departs from some other circuits in interpreting 
§ 30(A) to include the procedural requirement that the state Medicaid Director conduct 
cost studies before setting Medicaid rates. Id.; see infra notes 239–251 and accompanying 
text. The court noted in this opinion, however, that “[e]ven if we were to interpret § 30(A) 
to mandate a substantive rather than procedural result, the ten percent rate reduction 
might still conflict with the quality of care and access provisions of § 30(A), as the cuts 
have apparently forced at least some providers to stop treating Medi-Cal beneficiaries.” 
Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 657. 
216 See Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 129 S. Ct. at 2828. 
217 Maxwell-Jolly, 130 S. Ct. 3349, 3349 (2010) (mem.). 
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and, additionally, to consider the validity of the Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation of § 30(A).218 The Supreme Court has invited the Solicitor 
General to file a brief in response to the petition.219 This invitation 
prompted the National Association of State Medicaid Directors 
(“NASMD”) to send a letter to then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan, urg-
ing her to request that certiorari be granted.220 NASMD warned that if 
Independent Living Center is not overturned, “it could open the flood-
gates of litigation against the states on virtually any number of hun-
dreds of Medicaid provisions for which Congress did not intend to con-
fer judicially enforceable rights.”221 
 Even as the Director continues to challenge Independent Living Cen-
ter, plaintiffs in the Ninth Circuit have lost no time in using the case to 
support challenges to similar rate or service reductions in Medicaid 
and other state welfare programs.222 
 Plaintiffs beyond the Ninth Circuit are also beginning to challenge 
Medicaid rate cuts on the same theory, with varying success.223 For ex-
ample, in February 2010 in Minnesota Pharmacists Ass’n v. Pawlenty, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota allowed pharmacies and 
Medicaid recipients to proceed with discovery on the issue of whether 
                                                                                                                      
218 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Maxwell-Jolly, No.09-508 (U.S. filed Feb. 16, 
2010). 
219 Maxwell-Jolly, 130 S. Ct. at 3349. 
220 Letter from Carol H. Steckel, Chairperson, Nat’l Ass’n of State Medicaid Dirs., to 
Elena Kagan, U.S. Solicitor Gen. ( Jun. 18, 2010), available at http://www.nasmd.org/home/ 
doc/NASMD_LETTER_TO_Kagan.pdf. 
221 Id. 
222 See, e.g., Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847, 849, 853 (9th Cir. 
2009) (granting motion to stay AB 1183 (which cut Medi-Cal reimbursement rates for cer-
tain healthcare services) as to hospitals in a case alleging that AB 1183 is preempted by 
§ 30(A)); V.L. v. Wagner, 669 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109, 1118, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (relying 
in part on Independent Living Center in granting a preliminary injunction enjoining a Cali-
fornia law (which reduces or terminates in-home assistance for thousands of Californians) 
when plaintiffs challenged the law as preempted by various federal statutes, including 
§ 1396a(a)(17) of the Medicaid Act); Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, 603 F. 
Supp. 2d 1230, 1234–35, 1242 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Independent Living Center in granting 
a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of AB 1183 in a suit brought by pharma-
cists on the theory that AB 1183 is preempted by § 30(A)), aff’d Indep. Living Ctr. of S. 
Cal., Inc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 09-55692, 2010 WL 737650 (9th Cir. Mar. 3, 2010), petition for 
cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. Mar. 24, 2010) (No. 09-1158). 
223 See, e.g., Conn. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Rell, No. 10-2237-CV, 2010 WL 
2232693, at *31 (D. Conn. Jun. 3, 2010), aff’d No. 10-2237-CV, 2010 WL 3894794 (2d Cir. 
Oct. 6, 2010); Springfield Hosp. v. Hoffman, No. 09-CV-00254-CR, 2010 WL 3322716, at 
*38–40 (D. Vt. Apr. 9, 2010); Minn. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 
824–26, 828–29 (D. Minn. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs challenging a Medicaid rate cut as 
preempted by § 30(A) to conduct further discovery into the Secretary’s approval of the 
rate cut). 
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reductions in the rates set by Minnesota’s Medicaid program for brand-
name drugs were preempted by § 30(A).224 Similarly, the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Connecticut, in its October 2010 decision in 
Connecticut Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Rell, refused to dismiss an 
association of nursing facilities’ claim that a Connecticut budget provi-
sion, which froze some Medicaid reimbursement rates, was preempted 
by § 30(A).225 Although the court also refused to grant a preliminary 
injunction in the case, it reasoned that “if Plaintiff could prove that [the 
budget provision] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress, it would be pre-
empted.”226 However, in April 2010 in Springfield Hospital v. Hoffman, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont dismissed, for failure to 
state a claim, a case in which a hospital contended that adjustments to 
the disproportionate share hospital payments it receives through Ver-
mont’s Medicaid program are preempted by § 30(A).227 Because the 
hospital argued that state officials’ actions—rather than state legisla-
tion—conflicted with § 30(A), the court explained, the claim did “not 
arise under the Supremacy Clause which requires, as a condition prece-
dent to its application, a state-federal law conflict.”228 
 These district court cases, as well as the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in 
Independent Living Center and related cases, are instructive in anticipat-
ing some of the problems plaintiffs are likely to encounter in using 
§ 30(A) preemption suits to combat state cuts to Medicaid reimburse-
ment rates.229 Potential problems and limitations are considered in the 
next Part.230 
V. Preemption as a Workable Alternative? 
 In the wake of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 
2008 decision in Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. 
Shewry, preemption is a promising method of enforcing the equal ac-
                                                                                                                      
224 690 F. Supp. 2d at 828–29. 
225 2010 WL 2232693, at *6–9. 
226 Id. at *31 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Second Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in a summary order issued in 
October 2010; the order suggests that the Second Circuit may be receptive to § 30(A) pre-
emption claims because the preliminary injunction was affirmed not because the plain-
tiff’s claim was invalid, but simply because plaintiff had failed to show that the rate freeze 
would cause irreparable harm. See 2010 WL 3894794, at *1–2. 
227 2010 WL 3322716, at *2, *38–40. 
228 Id. at *39. 
229 See infra notes 239–303 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra notes 239–303 and accompanying text. 
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cess provision in order to protect providers’ Medicaid reimbursement 
rates.231 Nevertheless, although the court in Independent Living Center 
makes a persuasive case for preemption’s promise as an alternative to 
§ 1983, there are a number of significant pitfalls that could pose a 
threat to efficacy of preemption claims in the context of the equal ac-
cess provision.232 First, it may be harder to challenge a state law as con-
flicting with § 30(A) in jurisdictions that interpret the vaguely-worded 
provision differently than the Ninth Circuit.233 Second, if the Secretary 
approves a state’s Medicaid reimbursement rates, plaintiffs may find 
insurmountable the deference that some courts accord the Secretary’s 
approval.234 Third, if a state tries to avoid preemption problems by cut-
ting Medicaid reimbursement rates in a less direct manner than Cali-
fornia did with AB 5, plaintiffs may be unable to fit their claim under 
the Supreme Court’s “preemption” analysis rather than its “violation” 
analysis.235 Fourth, because the relief available in preemption cases is 
different from that available in § 1983 cases, preemption claims may be 
less appealing for plaintiffs.236 Fifth, if arguments that have been ad-
vanced by Justices Scalia and Thomas, in opposition to preemption 
suits, persuade either lower courts or a majority of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, it could become impossible to use any provision of the Medicaid 
Act to bring a preemption claim.237 And, sixth, Congress might try to 
remove this avenue of challenging reimbursement rates.238 Each of 
these issues is explored, in turn, below. 
A. Interpreting the Equal Access Provision 
 The chances of successfully establishing that a state has lowered 
Medicaid reimbursement rates in a way that conflicts with § 30(A) will 
                                                                                                                      
231 See See Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry (Independent Living I ), 543 F.3d 
1047, 1048–49 (9th Cir.), opinion issued by (Independent Living II ), 543 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009), and on remand to No. CV 08-3315, 2008 WL 
3891211 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2008), aff’d sub nom. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc. v. Max-
well-Jolly (Independent Living III ), 572 F.3d 644 (9th Cir. 2009), motion to vacate denied, 590 
F.3d 725 (9th Cir. 2009), and petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3500 (U.S. Feb. 16, 2010) 
(No. 09-958); supra notes 222–228 and accompanying text. 
232 See infra notes 233–238 and accompanying text. 
233 See infra notes 239–251 and accompanying text. 
234 See infra notes 252–257 and accompanying text. 
235 See infra notes 258–270 and accompanying text. 
236 See infra notes 271–279 and accompanying text. 
237 See infra notes 280–293 and accompanying text. 
238 See infra notes 294–303 and accompanying text. 
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likely depend on what the particular court deems to be the controlling 
interpretation of the equal access provision.239 
 Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have interpreted § 30(A) to 
include a procedural as well as a substantive requirement: these courts 
understand § 30(A) to require both that a substantive result of equal 
access be achieved and that certain factors be considered in the process 
of setting Medicaid reimbursement rates.240 Although the Ninth Circuit 
does not interpret § 30(A) to oblige state Medicaid programs to adhere 
to a rigid formula for determining reimbursement rates,241 the court 
understands § 30(A) to require states to “(1) rely on responsible cost 
studies . . . that provide reliable data as a basis for its rate setting, and 
(2) study the impact of the contemplated rate change(s) on the statu-
tory factors prior to setting rates, or in a manner that allows those studies 
to have a meaningful impact on rates . . . .”242 Similarly, the Eighth Cir-
cuit has interpreted § 30(A) to mean that a state Medicaid program is 
“obliged to consider” the factors listed in § 30(A)—access, economy, 
efficiency, and quality of care—in setting reimbursement rates.243 
 The Third and Seventh Circuits, however, in decisions analyzing 
§ 30(A), interpreted it to include a substantive requirement, but not a 
procedural one.244 The Seventh Circuit holds that § 30(A) requires 
                                                                                                                      
239 Compare Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 652 (interpreting the equal access clause 
as including a procedural as well as a substantive requirement and holding that “it is clear 
that the Director violated § 30(A) when he implemented the rate reductions mandated by 
AB 5”), with Conn. Ass’n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Rell, No. 10-2237-CV, 2010 WL 
2232693, at *25–26, *38 (D. Conn. Jun. 3, 2010) (interpreting the equal access clause as 
solely a substantive requirement and holding that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood 
of success on the merits as to its § 30(A) preemption claim), aff’d No. 10-2237-CV, 2010 
WL 3894794 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 2010). 
240 See Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 651, 653–54; Ark. Med. Soc’y, Inc. v. Reynolds, 
6 F.3d 519, 530 (8th Cir. 1993). 
241 Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 653 (explaining that a Medicaid program is not 
required to “follow a rigid formula of payments equal to an efficiently and economically 
operated hospital’s costs regardless of other factors”) (quoting Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Bel-
she, 103 F.3d 1491, 1498 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
242 Cal. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Maxwell-Jolly, 596 F.3d 1098, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (inter-
nal quotation marks and citations omitted), petition for cert. filed, 78 U.S.L.W. 3581 (U.S. 
Mar. 24, 2010) (No. 09-1158). 
243 Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 530; see also Minn. HomeCare Ass’n v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 917, 918 
(8th Cir. 1997) (concluding that § 30(A) “mandates consideration of the equal access fac-
tors of efficiency, economy, quality of care and access to services in the process of setting 
or changing payment rates,” but “does not require the State to utilize any prescribed 
method of analyzing and considering said factors”). To date, however, the Eighth Circuit 
has only interpreted § 30(A) in the context of a § 1983 suit. See Reynolds, 6 F.3d at 530; Go-
mez, 108 F.3d at 918. 
244 See Rite Aid v. Houstoun, 171 F.3d 842, 851 (3d Cir. 1999); Methodist Hosps. v. Sul-
livan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1030 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 655 (dis-
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state Medicaid programs “to produce a result,” but not to use a particu-
lar methodology to achieve that result.245 Similarly, the Third Circuit 
holds that § 30(A) requires a state Medicaid program “to achieve a cer-
tain result,” but does not require that a particular process be used to 
accomplish that result.246 Thus failure to consider the effect of a rate 
cut or to perform cost studies in reducing reimbursement rates would 
not be enough for the rate cut to be preempted by § 30(A) in these cir-
cuits.247 Nevertheless, the circuits that generally reject the notion that 
§ 30(A) imposes particular procedural requirements on the rate-setting 
process still tend to consider the motivations behind the rate cuts and 
apply a sort of arbitrary and capricious review to state rate-setting.248 
 The vagueness of the equal access provision poses a problem for 
actions brought under the Supremacy Clause similar to the one it 
posed for suits brought under § 1983.249 Because of a lack of data, it 
may be more challenging to establish a rate reduction’s substantive ef-
fect on access (particularly before the rate reduction is implemented) 
than to establish whether the requisite procedural steps were taken in 
setting the reduced rate.250 Thus, preemption suits will likely prove less 
successful in jurisdictions, like the Third and Seventh Circuits, which 
                                                                                                                      
cussing the approach of the Third and Seventh Circuits). The Third and Seventh Circuits 
have only interpreted § 30(A) in the context of a § 1983 suit—not a preemption suit. See 
Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 851; Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1030. But recently the Second Circuit, in an 
unpublished summary order, indicated its agreement with the Third and Seventh Circuits 
by affirming the denial of a preliminary injunction in a § 30(A) preemption suit in part 
“[b]ecause there is no procedural requirement under the ‘equal access provision.’” Rell, 
2010 WL 3894794, at *1. 
245 Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1030. 
246 Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 851 (“[S]ection 30(A) requires the state to achieve a certain re-
sult but does not impose any particular method or process for getting to that result.”). 
247 See id.; Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1030. 
248 See Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 853, 856 (noting that “budgetary considerations may not be 
the sole basis for a rate revision” and holding that in setting payment rates for pharmacists, 
the state Medicaid agency’s “decision-making” must be “reasonable and sound”); Reynolds, 
6 F.3d at 529 (applying “arbitrary and capricious” review to a state Medicaid agency’s re-
duction of reimbursement rates to determine if the agency violated § 30(A)); see also Inde-
pendent Living III, 572 F.3d at 656 (discussing this tendency). 
249 See Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 652 (holding that Belshe’s interpretation of 
§ 30(A) is just as persuasive in preemption cases as it had been in § 1983 cases); see also 
Visiting Nurse Ass’n of N. Shore, Inc. v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997, 1008, 1010 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(declining to rule that Massachusetts’s new method of setting Medicaid reimbursement 
rates was prohibited by § 30(A)’s procedural requirements); Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1029 (de-
ciding that plaintiffs failed to show that reimbursement rates set by Indiana’s Medicaid 
program violated the equal access provision). 
250 See Independent Living III, 572 F.3d at 652 (relying heavily on the legislature’s proce-
dural failures in evaluating whether a preliminary injunction was merited). 
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do not interpret § 30(A) to include a procedural requirement as well as 
a substantive one.251 
B. Dealing with Deference 
 Where the Secretary approves a state plan that includes the chal-
lenged reimbursement rates, courts may find that the Secretary’s con-
clusion that the reimbursement rates comply with § 30(A) should be 
entitled to substantial deference.252 
 For example, in 2004, in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of 
America v. Thompson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit held that the Secretary’s interpretation of the Medicaid 
Act has the force of law and is therefore reviewed only according to the 
deferential framework established in the Supreme Court’s 1984 deci-
sion in Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.253 This is be-
cause the Medicaid Act expressly delegates authority to the Secretary to 
evaluate and approve state Medicaid plans.254 Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
reasoned, under Chevron the Secretary’s interpretations of the Medicaid 
Act are controlling unless they are arbitrary and capricious.255 
 When the Secretary’s approval of state Medicaid plans is only sub-
ject to “arbitrary and capricious” review, plaintiffs alleging that § 30(A) 
preempts a Medicaid rate cut will encounter a heavy—but not impossi-
ble—burden of proof if the Secretary approves a state plan incorporat-
ing the cut.256 In addition to showing that the rate cut violates § 30(A), 
                                                                                                                      
251 See Rell, 2010 WL 2232693, at *25–26, *38 (finding § 30(A) not to contain a proce-
dural requirement and denying plaintiff a preliminary injunction in a § 30(A) preemption 
case); see also Rite Aid, 171 F.3d at 851; Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1030. 
252 See Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 822 (D.C. Cir. 
2004) (holding that the Secretary’s interpretation of the Medicaid Act is “entitled to Chev-
ron deference”); Minn. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d 809, 825–26 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed with discovery in a § 30(A) preemption case, 
but holding that “[t]he Secretary’s decisions interpreting the Medicaid statute are entitled 
to Chevron deference ‘because they carry the force of law’”). 
253 Thompson, 362 F.3d at 822; see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984). In Chevron, the Court held that where “Congress has explicitly left 
a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation” and any resultant “regulations 
are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the statute.” 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
254 Thompson, 362 F.3d at 821–22. 
255 Id. at 822. 
256 See Pawlenty, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 825–26 (concluding, where plaintiffs challenged a 
Medicaid rate cut approved by the Secretary as preempted by § 30(A), that although the 
Secretary’s approval is entitled to Chevron deference, “this Court’s review of that decision—
even under a deferential arbitrary and capricious standard—cannot proceed without a 
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as interpreted by that jurisdiction, such plaintiffs will likely have to show 
that the Secretary’s approval of the rate cut was arbitrary and capri-
cious.257 
C. Preemption Versus Violation 
 The U.S. Supreme Court consistently reaches the merits of cases in 
which a plaintiff asserts that a state law is preempted by a federal law, 
without considering the source of the plaintiff’s cause of action.258 The 
Court has been unwilling, however, to reach the merits of cases in which 
a plaintiff alleges that an unwritten state policy or practice violates a fed-
eral law unless the plaintiff can show a clear statutory right of action ei-
ther under § 1983 or the challenged statute itself.259 Some worry that 
preemption will therefore have a significantly narrower scope of cover-
age than § 1983 and that this distinction could incentivize states to de-
codify laws in order to avoid preemption challenges.260 It remains to be 
seen whether these issues will meaningfully limit the usefulness of pre-
emption as a way to challenge Medicaid reimbursement rates.261 
 Preemption’s usefulness as a way of enforcing § 30(A) hinges on 
how states go about reducing Medicaid reimbursement rates.262 If rates 
are reduced via a state law or regulation, plaintiffs challenging the re-
duction as preempted by § 30(A) would most likely be found to have an 
                                                                                                                      
more substantial record of the Secretary’s decision-making process” and allowing further 
discovery on this issue). 
257 See id. 
258 See, e.g., Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 274, 292 
(2006); Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 650, 667–68 (2003); 
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000) (granting plaintiffs in-
junctive relief, without addressing the source of their cause of action, where plaintiffs al-
leged that a Massachusetts law prohibiting state procurement from companies doing busi-
ness with Burma was preempted by a federal statute governing trade with Burma); see also 
supra notes 140–158 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s tendency to 
assume that the Supremacy Clause creates an implied cause of action for plaintiffs assert-
ing a federal preemption claim). 
259 See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) (holding that plaintiffs lacked a 
private right of action to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 where they 
claimed that the Alabama Department of Public Safety’s policy of administering driver’s 
license exams only in English violated Title VI); see also Bobroff, supra note 37, at 74; Sloss, 
supra note 139, at 357–58, 369. 
260 See Bobroff, supra note 37, at 74 (“[I]t remains an open question whether the scope 
of coverage under preemption will be as broad as under § 1983, particularly with regard to 
unwritten policies and practices not sanctioned by state laws.”); Sloss, supra note 139, at 
360 (noting that the differing treatment of “violation” and “preemption” cases “creates 
perverse incentives for states to de-codify laws”). 
261 See infra notes 262–270 and accompanying text. 
262 See Bobroff, supra note 37, at 74; Sloss, supra note 139, at 357–58, 369. 
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implied cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.263 This would be 
true in the case of regulations as well as statutes because the U.S. Su-
preme Court has expanded the principle it announced in 1983 in Shaw 
v. Delta Airlines, Inc.264—that federal courts have jurisdiction over suits 
alleging that a state statute is preempted by a federal statute—to in-
clude state regulations as well.265 Rate cuts, however, may not always be 
the product of a law explicitly cutting Medicaid reimbursement rates by 
ten percent, like the California act challenged in Independent Living Cen-
ter.266 If a state reduces Medicaid reimbursement rates without either 
passing a law or promulgating a regulation, and does so instead via un-
written policies or practices that are not sanctioned by state law, a court 
might find that plaintiffs challenging the cuts do not to have a valid 
cause of action under the Supremacy Clause.267 
 States with tight budgets will clearly wish to avoid preemption chal-
lenges when they target Medicaid reimbursement rates for cutbacks.268 
Nevertheless, although there is a great diversity in how states set rates, it 
is unlikely that states could reduce many rates via unsanctioned, unwrit-
ten policies, given that reimbursement rates are ultimately factored into 
state budgets.269 Thus, it seems unlikely that the Court’s “violation” ju-
risprudence will become a stumbling block for careful plaintiffs chal-
lenging rate reductions as preempted by the equal access provision.270 
                                                                                                                      
263 See Bobroff, supra note 37, at 74; Sloss, supra note 139, at 357–58, 369. 
264 See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983). 
265 See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 94 (2000) (holding that some regulations 
promulgated by Maine’s Office of Marine Safety were preempted by federal laws); see also 
Sloss, supra note 139, at 380–81; Chang Derek Liu, Note, The Blank Page Before You: Should 
the Preemption Doctrine Apply to Unwritten Practices?, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 350, 364 (2009). 
266 See 543 F.3d at 1053. 
267 See Springfield Hosp. v. Hoffman, No. 09-CV-00254-CR, 2010 WL 3322716, at *39–
40 (D. Vt. Apr. 9, 2010) (holding that plaintiff hospital failed to state a claim in a § 30(A) 
preemption case where “Hospital asserts that it is not state legislation but state officials’ 
actions in implementing the new [disproportionate share hospital] methodology that fail 
to comply with federal law”); see also Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14; Bobroff supra note 37, at 74; 
Sloss, supra note 139, at 357–58, 369. 
268 See Sack, supra note 79; supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing the 
various ways in which states go about setting Medicaid rates). 
269 See Herz, supra note 52, at 10 (observing that there is a great deal of variation 
among the states in terms of establishing, setting, and paying reimbursement rates); see also 
supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
270 See Bobroff supra note 37, at 74; Sloss, supra note 139, at 357–58, 369. 
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D. Relief Available 
 Irrespective of these issues, equal access challenges brought under 
the Supremacy Clause offer somewhat limited relief to plaintiffs.271 Al-
though plaintiffs can seek prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, 
money damages are unavailable in a federal preemption suit brought 
under the Supremacy Clause.272 Thus, there is no way for plaintiffs to 
use such a suit to obtain relief for past violations.273 
 For this reason, the Supremacy Clause and § 1983 serve somewhat 
different functions: the Supremacy Clause, which can be used to achieve 
injunctive relief, is useful for addressing systematic violations while 
§ 1983, which can be used to obtain money damages as well as injunctive 
relief, is more useful for remedying ad hoc violations.274 Therefore, a 
preemption challenge involving § 30(A) is clearly an effective way to 
address rate cuts, but is unlikely to be as effective a way as § 1983 to rem-
edy past effects of low reimbursement rates.275 
 The limited relief available to plaintiffs suing under the Supremacy 
Clause may also make it more difficult—and less appealing—for plain-
tiffs to sue at all.276 Because attorneys’ fees may be awarded in a § 1983 
suit, even resource-poor plaintiffs were typically able to hire attorneys 
on a contingency-fee basis to represent them in equal access actions 
brought under § 1983.277 Attorneys cannot be enlisted on the same sort 
of contingency-fee basis for Supremacy Clause actions because attorney 
fees are not available.278 As a result, it will likely be harder for resource-
poor plaintiffs to afford legal representation for even the strongest 
§ 30(A) Supremacy Clause complaint.279 
E. Minority Views on the U.S. Supreme Court 
 Preemption could be rendered an entirely ineffectual way of en-
forcing the equal access provision if either lower courts or a majority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court justices are persuaded by arguments that have 
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272 See Sloss, supra note 139, at 389; see also Independent Living II, 543 F.3d at 1063–64. 
273 See Sloss, supra note 139, at 389. 
274 Id. at 414. 
275 See id. 
276 See Sara Rosenbaum, Cal. HealthCare Found., Medicaid Payment Rate Law-
suits: Evolving Court Views Mean Uncertain Future for Medi-Cal 2, 11 (2009). 
277 See id. 
278 Id. 
279 Id. 
1622 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 51:1583 
been advanced by Justices Scalia and Thomas.280 These justices have ar-
gued that a preemption claim brought under the Medicaid Act—or any 
other law enacted under Congress’s Spending Clause power—should be 
rejected.281 
 Justices Scalia and Thomas have both suggested that beneficiaries 
of Spending Clause legislation generally lack a cause of action to en-
force such legislation because of its contractual nature.282 Their general 
argument seems to be that legislation enacted by Congress under its 
Spending Clause power “is much in the nature of a contract,” because 
such legislation usually involves an offer (the state’s submission of a 
plan to the federal government) and an acceptance (approval of the 
state plan by the federal government).283 As a result, private beneficiar-
ies of Spending Clause legislation (like Medicaid recipients) are effec-
tively third-party beneficiaries of a contract between the federal and 
state governments.284 Thus, because the common law restricts third 
party beneficiaries’ right to enforce a contract,285 Scalia and Thomas 
argue that third parties cannot sue—either under the Supremacy 
Clause or § 1983—to enforce Spending Clause legislation unless they 
are granted an explicit statutory right of action.286 
 Additionally, in separate concurrences in the Court’s 2003 deci-
sion in Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, both 
Scalia and Thomas suggested that, in the context of the Medicaid Act 
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specifically, private individuals cannot sue under the Supremacy Clause 
to enjoin state laws that violate provisions of the Medicaid Act because 
termination of federal funding is the only remedy available when a 
state plan violates the Act.287 Thomas placed great emphasis on Con-
gress’s delegation of “a type of pre-emptive authority” (the power to 
revoke federal funding from state plans that do not comply with the 
Medicaid Act’s requirements) to the Secretary via the Medicaid Act.288 
He interpreted this grant of authority to the Secretary to mean that 
noncompliant state plans should be de-funded, but “are not void under 
the Supremacy Clause,” explaining: “States are free to deviate from the 
Medicaid Act’s requirements, subject only to sanctions by the Secre-
tary.”289 Scalia echoed this argument in his concurrence.290 
 These arguments seem not to have persuaded a majority of the 
Court because in Walsh, and subsequently in 2006 in Arkansas Depart-
ment of Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn, the Court implicitly held 
that a private individual, without asserting any separate statutory cause 
of action, can properly challenge a state law as preempted by the Medi-
caid Act by suing for injunctive relief under the Supremacy Clause.291 
Furthermore, circuit courts have interpreted Walsh to suggest that 
plaintiffs can allege, under the Supremacy Clause, that a state law is 
preempted by federal spending clause legislation, just as with any other 
type of federal law.292 If the Court shifted to embrace such arguments 
or lower courts began to find this logic persuasive, however, suing un-
der the Supremacy Clause may not be an effective way for individuals to 
enforce the equal access provision.293 
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F. Congress’s Power 
 The final significant issue facing preemption in the context of the 
equal access provision is that Congress ultimately controls federal 
courts’ jurisdiction to decide cases.294 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
suggested that there is a presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction in 
cases in which a private individual sues under the Supremacy Clause to 
enjoin enforcement of a state law that allegedly conflicts with a federal 
law.295 A defendant in a preemption case can rebut this presumption, 
however, by establishing that Congress intended to prevent federal 
courts from having jurisdiction over claims arising out of a particular 
federal statute.296 This constraint is not unique to preemption claims; in 
fact, the Court has established a similar limitation on suits brought un-
der § 1983.297 
 Congress’s power over federal jurisdiction does mean that the abil-
ity of federal courts to consider preemption claims is ultimately subject 
to Congress’s whim.298 If Congress perceives that states are being dra-
matically constrained by an inability to make necessary cutbacks to 
Medicaid reimbursement rates during a major economic recession, it 
could amend the Medicaid Act to specifically bar federal jurisdiction.299 
 Theoretically, however, Congress could just as easily decide to 
augment, rather than undercut, federal courts’ ability to consider equal 
access provision challenges.300 Congress could do so in a number of 
ways.301 For example, Congress could write an explicit private cause of 
action into the equal access provision of the Medicaid Act.302 Alterna-
tively, Congress could breathe new life into § 1983, circumventing the 
Court’s newly conservative interpretation of the statute, by rewriting 
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§ 1983 so that it clearly allows courts to consider suits brought by bene-
ficiaries of safety net statutes—like the Medicaid Act—to enforce the 
benefits such statutes confer.303 
Conclusion 
 Despite its issues, preemption is a promising alternative method of 
enforcing the equal access provision. The U.S. Supreme Court, by 
reaching the merits of cases with no other apparent cause of action, has 
repeatedly implied that the Supremacy Clause creates a cause of action 
for plaintiffs alleging preemption of a state law by a conflicting federal 
law. In addition, the Supreme Court has indicated that it is more recep-
tive to suits brought under the preemption doctrine than under § 1983. 
And although the Ninth Circuit is as yet the only circuit court to fully 
embrace the enforceability of § 30(A) under the Supremacy Clause, sev-
eral circuit courts have recently held that plaintiffs can challenge state 
laws that conflict with federal statutes (even when the plaintiffs would 
not be able to do so under § 1983). Furthermore, several lower courts, 
outside of the Ninth Circuit, have accepted the reasoning of that court’s 
2008 decision, Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. She-
wry, with regard to the basic validity of § 30(A) preemption suits. 
 Currently—due to states’ shrinking budgets and expanding Medi-
caid rolls—the ability of both Medicaid recipients and providers to en-
force the equal access provision is particularly critical. Plaintiffs and 
courts should embrace § 30(A) preemption suits in order to protect 
access to healthcare for Medicaid recipients, from the elderly poor to 
needy children like Deamonte Driver. 
Rosemary B. Guiltinan 
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